Allen v. Houston Independent School District
689 F. App'x 238
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff Larry Allen, an African American over 50, worked in HISD’s Transportation Department; he alleges age and race-based mistreatment by supervisor Nathan Graf (reassigning duties, insulting comments, a distorted photo, and a written reprimand).
- Allen filed internal EEO complaints and learned his position was being eliminated after HISD consolidated roles and selected Chester Glaude for the combined position; Allen’s contract was not renewed and he was terminated after rejecting a severance offer.
- Allen sued under Title VII (race), the ADEA (age), the TCHRA, and later sought to add § 1981 and § 1983 hostile-work-environment and retaliation claims; the district court granted summary judgment for HISD on discrimination claims and mistakenly dismissed all claims, then reconsidered.
- Allen moved for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint adding § 1981 and § 1983 claims after discovery closed; the district court denied leave based on undue delay, closed discovery, and that the motion came after a second summary-judgment filing.
- The district court granted summary judgment to HISD on the remaining hostile-work-environment and retaliation claims, finding harassment was not sufficiently severe or pervasive and that HISD offered a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason (reorganization) with no showing of pretext.
- Allen appealed denial of leave to amend and summary judgment on retaliation; the Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding denial of leave was not an abuse of discretion and Allen failed to raise a genuine issue of pretext.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court abused discretion in denying leave to amend to add § 1981/§ 1983 claims | Allen: amendment was prompted by court rulings and merely expands legal theories; Title VII pleading put HISD on notice; no undue delay | HISD: amendment came after discovery closed and late timing prejudiced HISD because § 1981/§ 1983 require showing of a government policy/custom, which discovery could have explored | Denial affirmed — delay and closed discovery prejudiced HISD and imposed unwarranted burden; district court did not abuse discretion |
| Whether summary judgment on retaliation (Title VII/TCHRA) was improper because of temporal proximity, comparators, and qualifications of replacement | Allen: temporal proximity, lack of shown efficiency gains, comparator Aaron Hobbs, and Glaude’s lesser education show pretext | HISD: offered legitimate nonretaliatory reason (reorganization/position elimination); evidence does not show departure from procedure or unqualified replacement | Affirmed — prima facie met, but Allen failed to show pretext; comparator evidence speculative and Glaude’s qualifications not so inferior to infer pretext |
Key Cases Cited
- Cambridge Toxicology Grp., Inc. v. Exnicios, 495 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2007) (standard of review for denial of leave to amend)
- Martin’s Herend Imports, Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading U.S.A. Co., 195 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 1999) (leave to amend denied only for substantial reason like undue delay or prejudice)
- Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1981) (grounds supporting denial of leave to amend)
- Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989) (§ 1983 liability requires governmental policy or custom)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden-shifting framework for discrimination/retaliation claims)
- Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2010) (standard for reviewing summary judgment)
- Mayeaux v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 376 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2004) (delay must be undue and prejudicial to justify denying amendment)
- Lawrence v. U.T. Med. Branch, 163 F.3d 309 (5th Cir. 1999) (plaintiff bears burden to prove pretext once employer articulates legitimate reason)
- McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2007) (evidence of pretext must be more than speculative)
- Royal v. CCC & R Tres Arboles, L.L.C., 736 F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 2013) (application of burden-shifting in retaliation context)
