Allen v. American Cyanamid Co, 2:11-cv-00055

Background

About 170 plaintiffs sued Sherwin‑Williams and others under Wisconsin’s risk‑contribution theory, alleging lead‑carbonate pigment in childhood home paint caused injuries; several consolidated actions were assigned to Judge Lynn Adelman. Three cases went to trial in May 2019 with verdicts for plaintiffs; those judgments are on appeal. Additional cases remain pending in district court.
Judge Adelman authored a 2019 law‑review article criticizing the Roberts Court, corporate political speech jurisprudence, and Republican politics; portions included critical language about corporations and Republican Party positions and a reference to Chief Justice Roberts’ "balls‑and‑strikes" metaphor.
Third‑party Judicial Conduct Complaints resulted in a Seventh Circuit Judicial Council public admonition: it found Adelman’s substantive criticisms of Supreme Court decisions permissible but warned some partisan language could be interpreted as calling his impartiality into question; Judge Adelman publicly apologized for language that could be read as partisan.
Sherwin‑Williams moved to disqualify Judge Adelman under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), asserting the article, related comments (including the balls‑and‑strikes quip), and certain rulings create an appearance of bias—particularly on issues involving corporate First Amendment arguments and where defense counsel has ties to Republican circles.
Judge Adelman granted Sherwin‑Williams leave to file a supplemental memorandum, assessed the motion under the ‘‘reasonable observer’’ standard, and denied the disqualification motion, concluding the article and the other cited conduct do not create a reasonable appearance of partiality.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Judge Adelman’s law‑review article requires recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)	Article is protected academic and judicial critique; criticisms of doctrine do not show personal bias; Council recognized substantive criticism as permissible.	Article’s language condemns corporations, criticizes corporate speech decisions, and attacks Republicans — a reasonable observer could doubt impartiality in cases involving corporate defenses.	Denied. The article’s criticisms are within acceptable bounds; negative views of corporations or doctrines are not disqualifying without deeper personal animus.
Whether Judge’s judicial rulings, case management, or quips (e.g., balls‑and‑strikes comment) create appearance of bias	Judicial rulings alone rarely justify recusal; the quip was a contextual remark, not an intent to be partial.	The rulings and remarks, taken with the article, amplify an appearance of partiality.	Denied. Judicial rulings are grounds for appeal, not recusal, and the quip and rulings do not create a reasonable appearance of bias.
Whether the Judicial Council’s admonition supports recusal here	Council upheld substantive criticism and its limited concern about partisan language does not equate to disqualifying bias in these tort cases.	Council’s finding that some language could be interpreted as partisan supports a reasonable‑observer concern about impartiality.	Denied. The Council’s concerns were narrow (partisan language), and the cases here are not the sort of highly partisan matters that would implicate that concern.
Whether disqualification should apply to cases on appeal or potential remand	Even though appeals are pending, denial as to district‑court matters suffices; judge need not vacate judgments absent a Rule 60(b) motion and lacks jurisdiction while appeals pending.	Seeks disqualification across all related cases, including those on appeal or remand.	Denied as to all listed cases. Judge declines to vacate existing judgments and denies disqualification across the board.

Key Cases Cited

In re Sherwin‑Williams Co., 607 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 2010) (establishes reasonable‑observer standard for § 455 recusal analysis in this circuit)
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994) (judicial rulings alone almost never constitute bias requiring recusal)
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (perspective of a reasonable, informed observer governs appearance‑of‑impartiality inquiry)
Hathcock v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 53 F.3d 36 (4th Cir. 1995) (publicly denigrating statements plus improper conduct can require recusal)
Nicodemus v. Chrysler Corp., 596 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1979) (judge’s denigrating statements about defendant warranted disqualification)
Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 299 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2002) (errors in judicial rulings are matters for appeal, not automatic recusal)
Southern Pac. Commc’ns Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 740 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (judges may express prior views on law or policy without requiring disqualification)
Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013) (judge’s public statements about merits of not‑yet‑filed or pending matters can support disqualification)
In re United States, 572 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 2009) (recusal analysis requires assessing judge’s actions in their totality)
Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988) (addresses relief when recusal failure is raised post‑judgment)