Allen Surprise v. Andrew Saul, 968 F.3d 658

Surprise injured the tendon in his right middle finger (2009), underwent two surgeries and therapy; he also has cognitive/post-concussion deficits and treated depression/anxiety.
ALJ Toal (2012 hearing) found RFC limiting frequent overhead reaching and occasional fine manipulation but denied benefits; Appeals Council denied review.
District court remanded twice (2014 for incomplete VE transcript; 2017 by stipulation), returning the case for further evaluation of medical expert Dr. Wargel and mental RFC.
On remand ALJ O’Grady credited Dr. Wargel, who testified Surprise can do simple, routine, repetitive work defined as direct one- to three-step instructions (verbal/demo needed).
VE identified two light jobs (press operator, injection molder) that met the ALJ’s hypothetical; both have DOT reasoning level 2. ALJ O’Grady omitted the prior occasional fine-manipulation limitation and denied benefits.
On appeal Surprise argued (1) the ALJ failed to account for Dr. Wargel’s one- to three-step testimony and should have resolved an apparent DOT conflict, and (2) omission of the fine-manipulation limit violated the law of the case; the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the ALJ’s hypothetical and RFC failed to capture Dr. Wargel’s one- to three-step instruction limitation, creating an apparent conflict with the DOT that the ALJ had to resolve under SSR 00-4p	Dr. Wargel limited Surprise to one- to three-step instructions; VE’s identified jobs require GED reasoning level 2, so an obvious conflict existed that the ALJ should have addressed	The ALJ’s formulation (“routine, repetitive, simple, non-complex instructions”) reasonably captured Dr. Wargel’s opinion; VE said his testimony was consistent with the DOT; no obvious conflict was identified at hearing	No obvious conflict; ALJ’s hypothetical/RFC adequately accounted for the limitation; SSR 00-4p obligations satisfied and substantial evidence supports the decision
Whether ALJ O’Grady violated the law of the case by omitting ALJ Toal’s prior occasional fine-manipulation limitation from the RFC	The remand orders preserved ALJ Toal’s RFC finding (including occasional fine manipulation); ALJ O’Grady was bound to adopt it	The district court’s remand orders made no determinations about RFC or adopted ALJ Toal’s findings; law of the case applies only to issues actually decided	Law of the case not triggered: remand orders did not decide RFC issues, so ALJ O’Grady could reassess and was not required to adopt the prior fine-manipulation limitation

Stephens v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 323 (7th Cir. 2018) (standard of appellate review for SSA decisions)
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (definition of substantial evidence)
Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938) (substantial-evidence formulation)
Jozefyk v. Berryhill, 923 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2019) (upholding routine-task RFC formulations when they match psychological evidence)
Overman v. Astrue, 546 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2008) (claimant must show conflicts were obvious enough that ALJ should have noticed without assistance)
Stanton v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 899 F.3d 555 (8th Cir. 2018) (one- to two-step limitations can preclude jobs requiring reasoning level 2)
Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2019) (distinguishing limits phrased as "short, simple instructions" from numeric step limits)
Key v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1056 (7th Cir. 1991) (law of the case requires an issue actually decided on appeal)
Dobbs v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 885 F.3d 455 (7th Cir. 2018) (summary of law-of-the-case doctrine)
Poppa v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 2009) (remand without RFC determinations allows reassessment by lower tribunal)