Allen Killings, Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa, 16-1123

Background

Allen Killings was convicted of first‑degree murder (2009) and separately convicted of first‑degree robbery and sexual abuse; convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.
Killings filed two postconviction relief (PCR) applications docketed as PCCE068339 (murder) and PCCE069818 (robbery/sexual abuse); the court appointed one attorney to represent him in both matters.
On the eve of the PCCE069818 trial Killings sought new PCR counsel repeatedly, alternatively asking to proceed pro se while seeking new counsel to help present his pro se filings; the court permitted pro se proceedure with standby counsel but denied appointment of substitute counsel.
Trials were continued several times; the district court warned further continuances would not be granted, and ultimately heard the two PCR cases consecutively on the same day in October 2014.
At the October hearing Killings was unprepared, unresponsive when asked to present claims, and the district court denied his PCR application; Killings appealed denial and the denial of his requests for new counsel and separate trials.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the PCR court abused discretion by denying appointment of new PCR counsel	Killings argued appointed counsel was uncommunicative, uncooperative, unprepared, and representation of both cases prevented adequate preparation	State argued PCR applicants have no constitutional right to appointed counsel; appointment is discretionary and court reasonably refused last‑minute substitution	Court held no abuse of discretion; PCR applicants lack a constitutional right to counsel, court properly exercised discretion and found no ineffective assistance
Whether the court should have conducted a colloquy to ensure waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent	Killings argued the court should have made a formal inquiry to protect waiver	State argued no constitutional right to counsel in PCR so no colloquy required; court nonetheless inquired informally	Court held no colloquy required; record shows court questioned Killings and found waiver/request to proceed pro se was established
Whether trying both PCR cases consecutively on the same day was an abuse of discretion	Killings argued trying both matters together and appointing same counsel in both hindered preparation and fairness	State argued judicial economy justified consecutive trials; parties and counsel were the same and Killings had time to prepare	Court held no abuse of discretion; consecutive hearings were reasonable and within trial management discretion
Whether counsel’s performance warranted removal or a finding of ineffective assistance	Killings claimed counsel failed to preserve issues and prepare him for trial	State noted Killings alleged dissatisfaction but made no specific ineffective‑assistance claims showing prejudice	Court held Killings did not allege specific inadequate performance or prejudice; no ineffective assistance shown

Key Cases Cited

Leonard v. State, 461 N.W.2d 465 (Iowa 1990) (standard for abuse of discretion in appointing substitute counsel)
Fuhrmann v. State, 433 N.W.2d 720 (Iowa 1988) (no constitutional right to appointed counsel in collateral PCR proceedings)
Jones v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265 (Iowa 1991) (PCR proceedings are civil in nature; many criminal safeguards do not apply)
Jones v. State, 731 N.W.2d 388 (Iowa 2007) (statutory interpretation that PCR counsel may be appointed in court's discretion)
Dunbar v. State, 515 N.W.2d 12 (Iowa 1994) (standards for effective PCR counsel and need to show specific deficiencies and prejudice)
Tejeda v. State, 677 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 2004) (substitute counsel requests in criminal context disfavored if merely delay tactics)
Majeres v. State, 722 N.W.2d 179 (Iowa 2006) (constitutional right to counsel in criminal prosecutions explained)
Johnson v. Des Moines Metro. Wastewater Reclamation Auth., 814 N.W.2d 240 (Iowa 2012) (abuse of discretion standard for consolidation of actions)
State v. Johnson, 756 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 2008) (trial judge’s broad discretion in managing trials and consolidation)