Allen, Dennis Lee, WR-56,666-03

Background

Dennis Lee Allen was convicted of capital murder largely on testimony from jailhouse informants and other criminal witnesses; defense counsel (Jim Oatman) is deceased.
Post-conviction review revealed letters in the prosecutor Rick Jackson’s file from informants (notably Lonel Hardeman and Zane Smith) indicating expectations or requests for leniency in exchange for testimony.
Judge Mark Stoltz (original habeas judge) found the letters were Brady/Giglio material, were withheld, and that Jackson elicited and failed to correct false testimony (Napue/Giglio violation). The Dallas DA’s office joined Stoltz’s findings.
On remand the court ordered Jackson to testify. Judge Teresa Hawthorne subsequently credited Jackson’s testimony and found (relying on his notes) that he had turned over the physical evidence — concluding the letters were disclosed.
Applicant (Allen) files objections arguing Hawthorne’s findings ignore the trial record and circumstantial evidence showing the letters were not disclosed, point to Jackson’s admissions he knew the letters were Brady material, his lack of recollection/documentation, his post-trial assistance to informants, and that he failed to correct known false testimony.

Issues

Issue	Applicant's Argument	Jackson/State's Argument	Held / Trial-court posture cited by Applicant
Whether jailhouse letters were Brady/Giglio material and were disclosed to defense	Letters were exculpatory/impeachment material and were in prosecutor’s file; they were not timely disclosed to Oatman and their suppression undermined confidence in verdict	Jackson testified he had the letters, thought they were Brady, but has no specific recollection of disclosure and asserts he likely showed them with "knife & rest of physical evidence" at voir dire	Split below: Judge Stoltz found suppression (Brady violation); Judge Hawthorne credited Jackson and found disclosure; Applicant asks CCA to adopt Stoltz's findings
Whether prosecutor elicited or allowed false testimony and had duty to correct it (Napue/Giglio)	Jackson elicited and/or permitted Hardeman to testify falsely that he expected no help; Jackson admitted duty to correct and failed to do so — constitutional/Napue/Giglio violation requiring relief	Jackson admitted the testimony was false or misleading and that he had an obligation to correct it; he claimed uncertainty whether he did so and lacked specific recollection	Stoltz found Jackson elicited false testimony and failed to correct it; Applicant urges CCA to treat this as established constitutional violation
Proper fact‑finding/deference on remand — scope of review and use of circumstantial record evidence	Where direct recollection is absent, the court must consider all circumstantial and documentary evidence (trial transcript, Jackson's notes, timing of disclosure, trial counsel’s conduct) rather than accept bare equivocal testimony	Hawthorne relied primarily on Jackson’s testimony and an ambiguous file notation, treating it as proof of disclosure; Jackson urges his notes and practice support disclosure	Applicant argues Hawthorne’s reliance on equivocal testimony is improper; CCA is ultimate fact‑finder and should overturn Hawthorne if record contradicts her findings
Materiality / prejudice — whether suppressed evidence undermines confidence in verdict	The prosecution’s case rested on informants; letters and undisclosed benefits to witnesses (and failure to correct false testimony) were material and likely would have affected juror assessment and outcome	State previously agreed some suppression occurred as to Allen and co-defendant in earlier proceedings (Stoltz findings); Hawthorne did not disturb materiality finding but found disclosure occurred	Stoltz concluded suppressed evidence was material and relief was warranted; Applicant asks CCA to grant relief given centrality of snitch testimony

Key Cases Cited

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 87 (prosecutor must disclose evidence favorable to accused)
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (prosecutor must correct testimony known to be false about promises/consideration)
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (impeachment evidence of deals/understandings must be disclosed and false testimony corrected)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (materiality standard: verdict worthy of confidence)
Ex parte Navarijo, 433 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (CCA is ultimate fact‑finder; may reject trial court findings unsupported by record)
Ex parte Harleston, 431 S.W.3d 67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (trial-court findings must be weighed against objective record evidence)
Duggan v. State, 778 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (agreement or implied understanding with witness falls within Brady/Giglio principles)
Lacaze v. Warden, 645 F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 2010) (Brady extends to witness expectations of leniency; promise unnecessary)
Burkhalter v. State, 493 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (do not distinguish express deals from implied understandings for impeachment disclosure)
Thomas v. State, 841 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (Brady fairness inquiry focuses on trial fairness and not prosecutor’s good/bad faith)