942 F.3d 305
6th Cir.2019Background
- Allanah Benton, a former teacher, was convicted by a Michigan jury of having sex with a 12‑year‑old and sentenced to 25–38 years' imprisonment.
- After conviction and an unsuccessful direct appeal, the Supreme Court decided Lafler v. Cooper (2012), recognizing ineffective‑assistance claims where counsel's bad advice causes rejection of a favorable plea.
- Benton filed a state postconviction motion alleging her trial counsel pressured her to reject a one‑year plea because he told her parental rights would be automatically terminated; she asserted she would have accepted the plea if told termination was not automatic.
- Appellate counsel offered to stipulate to his own ineffectiveness to excuse Benton's failure to raise the claim on direct appeal; the state trial court denied relief on procedural (Mich. Ct. R. 6.508) and merits grounds, and higher state courts declined review.
- Benton sought federal habeas relief; the district court denied it and the Sixth Circuit (with a COA) affirmed, holding Benton procedurally defaulted and failed to show cause to excuse the default.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Procedural default—may federal court review Benton's ineffective‑assistance claim? | Benton: claim not raised on direct appeal because Lafler postdated the appeal and counsel was ineffective. | State: Benton failed to follow Mich. Ct. R. 6.508; state courts enforced rule; rule is adequate and independent. | Court: Claim is defaulted; state rule is an adequate and independent ground; federal review barred absent cause and prejudice. |
| Is Lafler's post‑decision novelty sufficient cause to excuse the default? | Benton: Lafler was decided after her direct appeal, so the legal basis was not reasonably available. | State: Lafler did not announce a novel rule—Sixth Circuit precedent already recognized such claims. | Court: Lafler was not so novel; novelty does not constitute cause. |
| Does appellate counsel’s stipulation of his own ineffectiveness establish cause? | Benton: appellate counsel offered to stipulate to his ineffectiveness, which should excuse the default. | State: A bare stipulation by counsel is insufficient proof that appellate counsel was ineffective for purposes of cause. | Court: Counsel’s self‑stipulation is threadbare and legally insufficient; Benton failed to show cause. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) (recognizes ineffective‑assistance claims when bad advice causes rejection of a favorable plea)
- Magana v. Hofbauer, 263 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 2001) (Sixth Circuit previously entertained claims that counsel's advice caused plea rejection)
- Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (establishes counsel‑ineffectiveness as potential cause to excuse procedural default)
- Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984) (novelty of legal claim can sometimes establish cause, but the bar is high)
- Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982) (discusses when legal tools to construct a claim were reasonably available)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (petitioner bears burden to prove ineffective assistance)
- Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986) (framework for procedural default and adequate independent state grounds)
- Dufresne v. Palmer, 876 F.3d 248 (6th Cir. 2017) (Michigan procedural rule treated as adequate and independent ground)
