59 F.4th 92
4th Cir.2023Background
- Alive Church bought 17 acres zoned A-1 (Agricultural) in Prince William County that previously had a Special Use Permit (SUP) allowing a house of worship, but compliance with SUP conditions would be costly and time-consuming.
- County zoning permits 14 by-right agricultural uses; 35 nonagricultural "special uses" (including religious institutions) require a site-specific SUP; farm wineries and limited-license breweries are allowed by right if on producing farms and ABC-licensed.
- Virginia law allows agritourism on agricultural operations and limits local regulation of usual events at farm wineries/breweries unless there is substantial public-health/safety impact.
- The County’s Zoning Verification Letter said the Church’s cultivation plans qualified as an agricultural operation but barred nonagricultural events (weddings, receptions, etc.) unless the Church obtained an ABC farm-winery/brewery license or a TAP/SUP; the Church declined ABC licensure for religious reasons and sued.
- The Church sued under RLUIPA (equal terms, nondiscrimination, substantial burden) and the Constitution (Free Exercise, Peaceable Assembly, Equal Protection); the district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| RLUIPA — Equal Terms (whether religious assemblies are treated worse than similarly situated secular assemblies) | Church: farm wineries/limited breweries and agritourism are similarly situated; County treats them better because they can host events by right if ABC-licensed. | County: comparator must be similarly situated with respect to ordinance’s purpose (promoting farming); religious assemblies aren’t agricultural in purpose and thus aren’t similarly situated to farm wineries. | Court: Church failed to identify a properly similarly situated secular comparator; no equal-terms violation. |
| RLUIPA — Nondiscrimination (intentional religious discrimination) | Church: differential treatment and Zoning Verification Letter imply discriminatory intent; intent can be inferred from treatment. | County: ordinance and letter merely apply neutral zoning rules; no facts show animus or deviation from standard process. | Court: Complaint lacks facts plausibly showing religious animus; nondiscrimination claim dismissed. |
| RLUIPA — Substantial Burden (whether requirements impose a substantial, government-imposed burden) | Church: requiring SUP or ABC license forces expensive delays and effectively bars worship before compliance. | County: Church purchased property with knowledge of SUP requirements; any burden is self-imposed and not absolute because compliance (eventually) allows assembly. | Court: Burden is self-imposed and not absolute (Church can hold services after SUP compliance); substantial-burden claim fails. |
| Constitutional claims (Free Exercise, Peaceable Assembly, Equal Protection) | Church: SUP and ABC-license pathway lack neutrality / target religion and fail strict or intermediate scrutiny; Church is similarly situated to agricultural event-hosts. | County: zoning is facially neutral and generally applicable; legitimate interests in preserving farmland and promoting wine/beer industries; rules survive rational basis or intermediate scrutiny. | Court: Ordinance is neutral/ generally applicable; passes rational-basis/intermediate scrutiny; no Equal Protection violation because Church not similarly situated to farm wineries; constitutional claims fail. |
Key Cases Cited
- Canaan Christian Church v. Montgomery Cnty., 29 F.4th 182 (4th Cir. 2022) (framework for RLUIPA equal-terms and comparator analysis)
- Jesus Christ Is the Answer Ministries, Inc. v. Balt. Cnty., 915 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2019) (test for RLUIPA nondiscrimination; intent inquiry)
- Bethel World Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery Cnty. Council, 706 F.3d 548 (4th Cir. 2013) (substantial-burden and zoning analysis for churches)
- Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (neutrality and intent analysis under Free Exercise Clause)
- Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (factors for discerning discriminatory intent)
- Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral time, place, manner restrictions)
- Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (time, place, manner regulation authority)
- Andon, LLC v. City of Newport News, 813 F.3d 510 (4th Cir. 2016) (self-imposed hardship doctrine in land-use cases)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard — courts need not accept legal conclusions)
- City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (equal protection principles and scrutiny levels)