922 F.3d 328
6th Cir.2019Background
- The City of Saginaw parking-enforcement officers repeatedly marked ("chalked") Alison Taylor’s tire treads to track parking duration and later issued citations when vehicles appeared not to have moved. Taylor was cited multiple times between 2014–2017; each citation listed the date/time of the chalking.
- Taylor sued the City and the officer (Tabitha Hoskins) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging chalking was a warrantless Fourth Amendment search violating her right to be free from unreasonable searches; Hoskins asserted qualified immunity.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing chalking was not a search or, alternatively, was reasonable under exceptions (community-caretaker and automobile exceptions); the City also argued implied license on appeal.
- The district court found chalking was a search but held it was reasonable because of a reduced expectation of privacy in vehicles and under the community-caretaker doctrine, and dismissed the complaint.
- The Sixth Circuit reversed: it held chalking is a search under the Jones trespass framework and that the City failed to show any warrant exception justified the conduct (automobile exception inapplicable; community-caretaker exception not met on these facts).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether chalking a tire constitutes a Fourth Amendment search | Taylor: marking tires is an intentional physical intrusion on a chattel and therefore a search | City: chalking is not a search (or is impliedly licensed by common practice) | Held: Yes — chalking is a search under Jones (common-law trespass + attempt to obtain information) |
| Whether the search was reasonable (warrantless) | Taylor: no established exception to the warrant requirement applies; chalking aimed at revenue/enforcement not safety | City: reduced privacy in automobiles and community-caretaker exception justify warrantless chalking | Held: Not reasonable — automobile exception requires probable cause (absent); community-caretaker exception not supported because no public-safety risk or imminent harm |
| Whether Cardwell/Cady-type precedents justify chalking | Taylor: Cardwell and Cady are distinguishable; those involved probable cause/impound or public-safety risks | City: Cardwell suggests vehicle touches can be reasonable without a warrant | Held: Cardwell is inapposite (relied on probable cause/impound); Cady’s community-caretaker rationale does not apply here |
| Whether an implied private-license (Jardines) defeats trespass finding | Taylor: no evidence of a societal custom granting license to chalk tires for enforcement | City: chalking is widespread and thus not trespass | Held: Jardines does not support an implied license here; City failed to show a private-citizen analogue or customary invitation |
Key Cases Cited
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (establishes reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test)
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (adopts property/trespass approach: physical intrusion on chattel to obtain information is a search)
- Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (community-caretaker exception applied where safety risk justified warrantless vehicle search)
- Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (upheld exterior vehicle inspection post-impound based on probable cause; distinct facts)
- Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (discusses implied license for conduct typical of private citizens; limited application)
- California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (recognizes diminished expectation of privacy in vehicles informing automobile exception)
- Jeffers v. United States, 342 U.S. 48 (government bears burden to show warrant exception)
- Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches; not all searches proscribed)