Algee v. Hren
375 P.3d 386
Mont.2016Background
- Algee and the Hrens own adjoining parcels; the Hrens have an easement that crosses Algee’s property and along a creek embankment.
- In Aug. 2010 the Hrens began building an access road on their easement; Algee complained to the Cascade Conservation District (CCD), which issued a stop-work order; the Hrens revised plans, obtained a 310 permit, and completed the road in Oct. 2010 at about $40,000 cost.
- Algee waited until Aug. 21, 2013 (nearly three years later) to sue the Hrens alleging destruction of an access trail; he filed a lis pendens days before the Hrens’ scheduled closing, which prevented their sale.
- The Hrens moved for partial summary judgment; the District Court held Algee’s trespass and negligence claims barred by statutes of limitation and the remaining claims barred by laches, and certified the order as final under M. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
- On appeal, the sole contested question was whether the District Court properly applied laches to bar Algee’s remaining claims; the Supreme Court reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether laches bars Algee’s claims that are not time‑barred by statute | Algee argued laches should not be applied (also contested timeliness of Hrens’ pleadings on appeal) and that delaying three years was insufficient to bar claims still within statute of limitations | Hrens argued Algee knew of the alleged injury during construction, remained silent while they obtained the 310 permit and completed the road, and that his delay prejudiced them (costs spent and a failed sale due to lis pendens) | Court held laches applies: Algee lacked diligence by allowing completion of the road before objecting, and that his delay prejudiced the Hrens; summary judgment for Hrens affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Williard v. Campbell Oil Co., 248 P. 219 (Mont. 1926) (bench‑trial precedent cited on procedural posture)
- Castillo v. Franks, 690 P.2d 425 (Mont. 1984) (describes laches as refusal to remedy stale demands after long acquiescence)
- Shimsky v. Valley Credit Union, 676 P.2d 1308 (Mont. 1984) (laches can bar claims commenced within statutory limitations when equitable considerations warrant)
- Montgomery v. First Nat’l Bank of Dillon, 136 P.2d 760 (Mont. 1943) (illustrative equitable application of laches)