Alfredo Camargo v. Charles Ryan
684 F. App'x 607
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Camargo pleaded guilty in 2008 and pursued Arizona post-conviction relief (PCR) under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32, initially with appointed advisory counsel and later pro se.
- The Superior Court dismissed his first pro se PCR on July 7, 2010; advisory counsel had requested and obtained a 30-day extension to seek rehearing or review on July 28, 2010.
- Camargo filed a pro se petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals on August 30, 2010; the Court of Appeals dismissed it as untimely on September 3, 2010 without accounting for the extension (the State later conceded this was error).
- Camargo filed a second pro se PCR on September 24, 2010 alleging ineffective assistance of PCR counsel; the Superior Court dismissed it as untimely/successive, but the State later conceded those rulings were incorrect and the second petition was timely and not successive.
- The Arizona Court of Appeals denied review of the second PCR on December 4, 2012; the Arizona Supreme Court denied review on March 27, 2013.
- Camargo filed a federal habeas petition on December 3, 2013. The district court found the petition untimely under AEDPA, declined to find his state petitions ‘‘properly filed’’ for statutory tolling, and refused equitable tolling. The Ninth Circuit reversed on equitable tolling and remanded for merits consideration.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether AEDPA limitations barred Camargo's federal habeas petition | Camargo argued state-court timeliness errors and diligent filings made his federal petition timely if equitable tolling applied | State argued petition was filed after AEDPA one-year period and state-court dismissals prevented statutory tolling | Court held equitable tolling applies, making the federal petition timely |
| Whether state-court rulings could be treated as ‘‘properly filed’’ for statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) | Camargo urged that errors in state timeliness rulings should not preclude statutory tolling | State maintained district court lacked authority to override state timeliness rulings for § 2244(d)(2) purposes | Court declined to decide whether § 2244(d)(2) permitted treating the petitions as properly filed (left for another day) |
| Whether equitable tolling standard is met | Camargo asserted he diligently pursued relief and was prevented from timely filing by repeated erroneous state-court and State actions | State contended errors did not warrant equitable tolling and petitioner failed to show extraordinary circumstances causing untimeliness | Court held extraordinary circumstances existed (repeated state errors and State misstatements) and Camargo acted diligently, so equitable tolling applies |
| Scope/duration of equitable tolling | Camargo sought tolling from filing of second PCR through conclusion of state review | State disputed tolling period and argued later starting dates might apply | Court tolled AEDPA from Sept 24, 2010 (second PCR filing) until March 27, 2013 (Arizona Supreme Court denial); thus federal petition timely |
Key Cases Cited
- Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2006) (equitable tolling requires diligence and extraordinary circumstances)
- Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2009) (petitioner must show extraordinary circumstances caused untimeliness)
- Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2011) (reasonable diligence standard for equitable tolling)
- Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 879 (9th Cir. 2014) (undisputed equitable-tolling facts are reviewed de novo)
- Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2003) (standard for reviewing equitable tolling questions)
- Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) (effect of state-court timeliness rulings on statutory tolling under § 2244(d))