Alfonso Ignacio Viggers v. Al-Azhar Pacha
334522
| Mich. Ct. App. | Aug 15, 2017Background
- Viggers worked as an ALPAC contractor assigned to the University of Michigan; ALPAC president Pacha handled his immigration sponsorship (green card).
- The University offered Viggers a permanent position in December 2014; ALPAC released him from a non‑compete so he could pursue it.
- After Viggers accepted the University job, Pacha’s immigration counsel warned continuing sponsorship could be improper if Viggers would not remain with ALPAC.
- Viggers sent two emails (June 20 and July 1, 2015) that Pacha interpreted as threats (“what goes around comes around”); Pacha then informed University personnel and terminated Viggers on July 30, 2015.
- The University rescinded its job offer on July 31; Viggers sued for defamation, tortious interference with a business expectancy, and wrongful termination. The trial court granted summary disposition for defendants; the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Defamation (per se or common) | Viggers: Pacha falsely accused him of threats causing reputational harm and job loss | Pacha: statements were made in good faith to proper University officials and were privileged; no defamation per se because no accusation of a specific crime | Court: No defamation per se; communications were protected by qualified privilege and plaintiff failed to show actual malice; claim dismissed |
| Tortious interference with business expectancy | Viggers: Pacha’s statements to the University caused the rescission and interfered with his employment expectancy | Pacha: privileged communications concerning employment matters; no malice shown | Court: Privilege applies to interference claim as well; plaintiff failed to rebut with actual malice; claim dismissed |
| Wrongful termination / public policy violation | Viggers: Pacha conditioned continuation of green card sponsorship on declining the University offer, violating public policy / MCL 750.351 | Pacha: termination was at‑will and no statutory violation shown; even if statute implicated, WFBA provides exclusive remedy and administrative exhaustion required | Court: No public‑policy exception triggered; no violation of MCL 750.351 shown and WFBA would be the exclusive remedy; wrongful termination claim dismissed |
| Summary disposition standard | Viggers: disputed facts (timing, inconsistent testimony) create issues for trial | Defendants: evidence viewed in plaintiff’s favor still fails to show malice or statutory violation; qualified privilege applies as a matter of law | Court: Reviewed de novo and treated motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10); defendants entitled to judgment as a matter of law |
Key Cases Cited
- Tomkiewicz v. Detroit News, Inc., 246 Mich. App. 662 (2001) (accusations of criminal activity are defamation per se)
- Gonyea v. Motor Parts Fed. Credit Union, 192 Mich. App. 74 (1991) (employer has qualified privilege to communicate about employees to interested parties)
- Prysak v. Polk Co., 193 Mich. App. 1 (1992) (elements of qualified privilege and actual malice standard)
- Barnard Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Gates Performance Eng’g, Inc., 285 Mich. App. 362 (2009) (standard of review for summary disposition)
- Baker v. Arbor Drugs, Inc., 215 Mich. App. 198 (1996) (evidence to be considered on MCR 2.116(C)(10))
- Suchodolski v. Mich. Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692 (1982) (public‑policy exception to at‑will employment doctrine)
- Lakeshore Comm. Hosp., Inc. v. Perry, 212 Mich. App. 396 (1995) (tortious interference may be caused by defamatory statements)
- Cork v. Applebee’s of Mich., Inc., 239 Mich. App. 311 (2000) (WFBA provides exclusive remedy for certain violations related to MCL 750.351)
- Kefgen v. Davidson, 241 Mich. App. 611 (2000) (treating mixed MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10) rulings as C(10) when court considered matters beyond pleadings)