Alexys Sherry Parker v. Officer Adam Chard
777 F.3d 977
8th Cir.2015Background
- On Oct. 26, 2011, Minneapolis officers Chard and Illetschko responded to reports of shoplifting in Uptown after an anonymous Heartbreaker customer indicated a “couple of black females” ran out of Victoria’s Secret.
- Heartbreaker manager identified Parker and two friends as matching the description; the anonymous caller left no name or contact and did not report specific stolen items.
- Officers observed the group, followed them; Parker consented to a bag search, officers found nothing stolen, and Chard ran Parker’s license then told her she was free to leave.
- Parker requested to call her father and handed the phone to the officer for a 5–10 minute call; officers then went to Victoria’s Secret to review security video.
- Parker sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging an unreasonable seizure without reasonable suspicion; the district court denied qualified immunity and the officers appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers seized Parker without reasonable suspicion in violation of the Fourth Amendment | Parker: seizure was based only on an unreliable, uncorroborated anonymous tip and thus lacked reasonable suspicion | Officers: action was reasonable given the tip, minimal corroboration, and context of nearby recent shoplifting reports | Court assumed a Fourth Amendment violation for argument's sake but did not ultimately resolve this as a clear-established-law denial |
| Whether the constitutional right (if violated) was clearly established at the time, defeating qualified immunity | Parker: right to be free from seizure based on such an anonymous eyewitness tip was clearly established | Officers: law was not clearly established; reasonable officers could disagree about sufficiency of the tip and corroboration | Held: right was not clearly established; officers entitled to qualified immunity |
| Whether precedent requiring predictive corroboration (J.L./White) compelled denial of qualified immunity here | Parker: J.L. and White require more corroboration so tip was insufficient | Officers: those cases do not clearly control eyewitness tips about observable conduct; circumstances differ | Held: existing precedent did not place question beyond debate; officers could reasonably rely on their assessment |
| Whether later cases (e.g., Navarette) clearly established the rule at the time of the seizure | Parker: later cases support invalidating the stop | Officers: Navarette postdates the incident and cannot be used to show clearly established law at the time | Held: Navarette cannot be used to clearly establish law retroactively; immunity remains |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes investigatory stop standard requiring reasonable suspicion)
- Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) (anonymous tip of concealed weapon insufficient without indicia of reliability)
- Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990) (anonymous tip corroborated by predictive details can supply reasonable suspicion)
- Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (analyzes indicia of reliability for an eyewitness 911 tip)
- United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (totality-of-the-circumstances standard for reasonable suspicion)
- Wheat v. United States, 278 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2001) (discusses limits on requiring predictive corroboration and treats certain eyewitness tips differently)
- Meehan v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2014) (qualified immunity standard on appeal of denial)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (modern qualified immunity framework)