Alexandra Rodriguez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
159 A.3d 914
| N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | 2017Background
- Rodriguez alleged a metal retail "endcap" fell on her at a Wal‑Mart in 2010, causing right‑arm injury and later a spinal cord stimulator for persistent pain; liability hinged largely on her credibility because no eyewitnesses testified.
- Plaintiff presented medical experts (orthopedist, neurologist, CRPS specialist) who diagnosed injury and Type II Complex Regional Pain Syndrome and tied it to the accident.
- Wal‑Mart defended liability and causation and called a defense neurologist who examined Rodriguez and testified at trial about inconsistencies between her complaints and objective findings.
- The defense neurologist (not a psychiatrist/psychologist) testified at length that Rodriguez engaged in "somatization," "symptom magnification," and possibly psychogenic pain; he also suggested pseudo‑seizures and psychological contributions to her complaints.
- The trial court admitted that testimony over plaintiff's objection, gave a limiting instruction, and the jury returned a unanimous no‑cause verdict; Rodriguez appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of expert testimony that plaintiff "magnified" symptoms/malingered | Rodriguez argued expert testimony invaded the jury's exclusive province to decide witness credibility and was unduly prejudicial | Wal‑Mart argued the neurologist was qualified to opine that complaints were inconsistent with objective findings and that such opinion was probative | The court held expert opinions labeling a plaintiff a "malingerer" or asserting "symptom magnification" are categorically disallowed at civil jury trials under N.J.R.E. 403 because they improperly usurp the jury's role and are unduly prejudicial; reversal and new trial ordered |
| Scope of permissible medical testimony about inconsistencies | Rodriguez contended any opinion that effectively branded her dishonest was improper | Wal‑Mart contended experts may explain inconsistencies between subjective complaints and objective tests | Court held experts may testify to factual observations (what they saw) and may say subjective complaints are inconsistent with objective findings, but may not offer credibility‑concluding labels (malingering/symptom magnification) in jury trials |
| Qualifications of the defense expert to give psychological/malingering opinions | Rodriguez argued neurologist lacked psychiatric qualifications to opine on somatoform/malingering issues | Wal‑Mart emphasized the neurologist’s extensive credentials and experience evaluating patients | Court noted even if such opinions were permitted, this neurologist lacked appropriate mental‑health qualifications; nonetheless the broader testimony was excluded on jury‑usurpation/403 grounds |
| Effect of limiting jury instruction | Rodriguez argued instruction could not cure the prejudice of the expert's testimony | Wal‑Mart argued instruction would mitigate any undue influence | Court held a limiting instruction was insufficient to cure the prejudicial impact of the expert’s malingering/symptom‑magnification testimony |
Key Cases Cited
- Nichols v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 154 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. 1998) (expert testimony labeling plaintiff malingering or impugning credibility in a jury trial is highly prejudicial and may be excluded under Rule 403)
- DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 (N.J. 2005) (experts may testify about inconsistencies between subjective complaints and objective clinical findings)
- State v. Jamerson, 153 N.J. 318 (N.J. 1998) (credibility determinations are the exclusive province of the jury; experts may not opine on a witness’s veracity)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (U.S. 1993) (expert evidence can be powerful and misleading; courts must weigh probative value against undue prejudice under Rule 403)