Alexandra Burns v. Michael Donald Burns, 434 S.W.3d 223

Alexandra and Michael Burns are divorced parents of M.A.; an agreed final decree (2005) named them joint managing conservators and set phased visitation for Michael tied to psychiatric treatment and compliance with medication.
Michael had a bipolar disorder diagnosis, underwent a court-ordered psychological evaluation, and initially complied with visitation; he saw M.A. frequently through mid-2006.
Visits became sporadic, then ceased; Michael saw M.A. rarely in 2006–2007 and not at all from 2008 until trial. He continued paying child support.
Parties disputed why visits stopped: Alexandra said Michael canceled or failed to appear; Michael said conflict with Alexandra led him to withdraw to avoid further harm.
Alexandra petitioned to terminate Michael’s parental rights under Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(1)(E) (endangerment) and on best-interest grounds; the trial court denied the petition.
The court of appeals affirmed, concluding Alexandra failed to prove statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence and did not meet the heightened factual-sufficiency standard for termination.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Michael’s prolonged absence from M.A. constitutes endangerment under Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(1)(E)	Burns argued Michael judicially admitted his absence endangered the child’s emotional well‑being and that absence alone established endangerment.	Michael admitted the absence had emotional effects but maintained his withdrawal was to avoid further harm, he continued support payments, and disputes existed about who obstructed visitation.	Court held absence and Michael’s testimonial admission did not, as a matter of law or by clear and convincing evidence, establish endangerment; testimonial admission was not an unequivocal judicial admission.
Whether termination is in the child’s best interest	Burns argued termination would serve M.A.’s best interest and permit adoption by her husband, who has parented M.A.	Michael argued termination would permanently sever the parent-child relationship despite his desire to reconnect and his continued financial support.	Court declined to reach best-interest as a dispositive ground, noting presumption favoring preservation of parent-child relationship and that Alexandra failed to prove statutory grounds.

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (discussing the fundamental nature of parental rights and the high burden for termination)
Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. 1985) (termination is final and divests parental rights)
In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002) (clear-and-convincing standard and appellate review guidance in termination cases)
In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. 2002) (factual-sufficiency review with heightened burden)
In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796 (Tex. 2012) (parental absence alone—incarceration or deportation context—does not automatically show endangerment)
Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. 1987) (endangerment need not be directed at the child but requires more than metaphysical injury)