Alexander v. the State
328 Ga. App. 300
Ga. Ct. App.2014Background
- Calvin Alexander entered a non-negotiated Alford guilty plea to multiple child sexual offenses and was sentenced after the State proved two prior felony convictions and sought recidivist sentencing under OCGA § 17‑10‑7(a).
- At the plea hearing Alexander acknowledged understanding the plea was non‑negotiated, that the judge would determine sentence, and that the State requested 30 years.
- The trial court imposed concurrent sentences, including 30 years on aggravated child molestation with 15 years to serve in incarceration and the balance on probation, after finding recidivist sentencing applicable.
- Alexander moved post‑sentence to withdraw his plea, claiming ineffective assistance because counsel did not advise him that the plea would make him ineligible for parole.
- Trial counsel testified he could not recall advising Alexander about parole ineligibility but knew the recidivist statute constrained the judge’s sentencing options; the trial court denied relief, finding the plea knowing, voluntary, and competently advised.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel’s failure to advise that plea would make Alexander ineligible for parole constituted deficient performance under Strickland | Alexander: Padilla requires counsel to advise on significant collateral consequences; failure to advise about parole was deficient and warrants plea withdrawal | State: Parole ineligibility is a collateral consequence; under Williams counsel’s failure to advise cannot as a matter of law be deficient | Court affirmed: Bound by Williams — parole ineligibility is collateral, so failure to advise cannot establish deficient performance |
| Whether collateral vs. direct consequence distinction applies to Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance claims | Alexander: Padilla suggests counsel must warn clients of important collateral consequences; collateral/direct distinction should not bar Sixth Amendment claims | State: Collateral consequences doctrine bars the claim because parole is collateral and the plea was knowing and voluntary | Court: Recognized Padilla’s significance but held Williams remains controlling; collateral consequence doctrine applies here |
Key Cases Cited
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (counsel must provide reasonably competent advice regarding deportation risks associated with a plea)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580 (Ga. 1999) (parole ineligibility is a collateral consequence; failure to advise about parole does not constitute deficient performance as a matter of law)
- Smith v. State, 287 Ga. 391 (Ga. 2010) (discussing Padilla and preserving the direct/collateral distinction for due‑process plea advisements)
