Alexander v. State, 297 Ga. 59

Calvin Alexander pled guilty via a non-negotiated Alford plea to multiple sexual offenses and received lengthy sentences, some imposed under the recidivist statute.
After sentencing he moved to withdraw his plea, claiming ineffective assistance because counsel failed to advise him he would be ineligible for parole as a recidivist.
Trial counsel testified at the hearing he did not recall discussing parole eligibility; the trial court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on Williams v. Duffy.
Williams v. Duffy had held that failure to advise about parole (a collateral consequence) could not, as a matter of law, constitute deficient performance by counsel.
The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari to reassess Williams in light of later U.S. Supreme Court decisions (Hill, Padilla) and state decisions distinguishing direct vs. collateral consequences.
The Court overruled Williams, held Strickland governs ineffective-assistance claims about guilty-plea advice (including collateral consequences like parole ineligibility), and remanded for the trial court to apply Strickland prejudice and performance analysis.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Williams v. Duffy remains controlling law on counsel’s duty to advise about collateral consequences	Alexander: Williams is incorrect; counsel’s failure to advise about parole can be ineffective assistance under Strickland	State: Williams controls; parole ineligibility is collateral and not a basis for deficient performance per Williams	Overruled Williams; Strickland governs ineffective-assistance claims about plea advice, direct vs collateral distinction is not dispositive
Whether failure to advise a defendant he will be ineligible for parole as a recidivist is constitutionally deficient	Alexander: Counsel’s failure to inform about parole ineligibility rendered assistance deficient and affected plea choice	State: Such parole consequences are collateral and counsel’s omission cannot be per se deficient (per Williams)	Court: Failure to advise about recidivist parole ineligibility can be deficient because statute is clear, automatic, and parole ineligibility is a drastic consequence
Standard and remedy for adjudicating the claim	Alexander: Apply Strickland and show he would have declined plea if informed	State: Trial court’s prior ruling should stand under Williams	Court: Remanded for trial court to apply Strickland: determine deficient performance and whether prejudice exists (reasonable probability defendant would have gone to trial)

Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580 (reversed; previously held parole ineligibility is collateral and omission not per se ineffective assistance)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (applied Strickland to plea-stage ineffective-assistance claims)
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (counsel must advise about clear, serious collateral consequences like deportation; direct/collateral distinction not controlling)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two-prong ineffective-assistance standard: performance and prejudice)
Smith v. State, 287 Ga. 391 (Georgia acknowledged Padilla and separated trial-court plea voluntariness from counsel’s Sixth Amendment duties)
Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 878 (Court of Appeals applied Padilla logic to hold failure to advise about sex-offender registration can be deficient)
Encarnacion v. State, 295 Ga. 660 (explains prejudice requirement in plea-withdrawal ineffective-assistance context)