Alexander v. Eagle Manufacturing Co.
714 F. App'x 504
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Alexander worked at Eagle Manufacturing performing final checks on engine blocks before shipment; Ford inspectors marked defective blocks with “E-2.”
- Alexander observed first-shift employees removing E-2 markings from defective blocks and confronted them; a first-shift supervisor said he would sign the paperwork instead.
- Alexander told his supervisor he would report the tampering to HR; he was placed off for the day and then fired before he could report it.
- Alexander sued for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy under Kentucky law; the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim and denied leave to amend.
- The Sixth Circuit majority affirmed, holding Alexander’s facts did not fit Kentucky’s narrow refusal-to-violate-the-law exception to at-will employment and that Alexander failed to properly seek leave to amend.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Alexander pleaded wrongful discharge under Kentucky’s public-policy exception for refusing to violate the law | Alexander: witnessing and refusing to participate in coworkers’ unlawful scheme suffices even without an explicit employer request | Eagle: plaintiff must show an affirmative employer request to violate the law; no such request here | Court: claim fails—Alexander was not shown to have been asked or made inevitably complicit; exception not met |
| Whether future routine duties would have inevitably forced Alexander to participate in illegality | Alexander: his regular duties would have required signing off on tampered blocks, making participation inevitable | Eagle: supervisor indicated he (the supervisor) would sign, and complaint does not allege inevitability or systematic practice | Court: complaint does not plausibly allege inevitability or required criminal intent, so no protected refusal |
| Whether Kentucky law requires an affirmative request from the employer to invoke the exception | Alexander: an explicit request is not required; witnessing and refusing should suffice | Eagle: precedent (Kentucky Ct. App. and some courts) supports an affirmative-request requirement | Court: uncertain whether Kentucky Supreme Court would require an explicit request, but even without that requirement Alexander’s allegations fall short |
| Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend | Alexander: asked for leave to amend in opposition brief | Eagle: plaintiff failed to follow proper procedure or supply proposed amendments | Court: denial affirmed—Alexander did not describe or attach proposed amended complaint; denial was not error |
Key Cases Cited
- Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684 (6th Cir. 2006) (standard of review for 12(b)(6))
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (pleading requires more than sheer possibility)
- Logsdon v. Hains, 492 F.3d 334 (6th Cir. 2007) (accept factual allegations and draw inferences in plaintiff's favor)
- Pennington v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 553 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2009) (applying state law in federal court)
- Kepley v. Lanz, 715 F.3d 969 (6th Cir. 2013) (predicting state law when highest court hasn’t spoken)
- Ziegler v. IBP Hog Mkt., Inc., 249 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2001) (weight of state appellate decisions in Erie predictions)
- Combs v. Int’l Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2004) (caution against substantive innovation in state law)
- Firestone Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983) (Kentucky recognizes at-will employment rule)
- Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1985) (narrow public-policy exceptions to at-will rule)
- Hill v. Ky. Lottery Corp., 327 S.W.3d 412 (Ky. 2010) (refusal-to-violate-the-law and rights-conferred exceptions explained)