ALEXANDER HUGHES v. UNITED STATES
150 A.3d 289
| D.C. | 2016Background
- Defendant Alexander Hughes, supervisor at a federal cafeteria, was indicted on 26 counts alleging sexual abuse, assault, kidnapping, and destruction of property involving three female co-workers (Lopez, Sanchez, Mohamud) over ~Dec 2011–Dec 2012.
- At trial the jury convicted Hughes on 14 counts: multiple serious sexual-abuse counts and kidnapping relating to Lopez, one misdemeanor sexual-abuse count relating to Sanchez, and three counts (two misdemeanors and one property count) relating to Mohamud; several other counts were dismissed or resulted in acquittal.
- Government evidence included victim testimony describing forcible anal and oral penetration of Lopez, repeated unwanted sexual contacts, threats of firing, physical assaults, and physical evidence (semen on gloves matching Hughes’ DNA) found in the changing-room crawlspace.
- Defense argued the incidents were workplace "horseplay," claimed Lopez fabricated the serious sexual acts, and moved pretrial to sever counts involving Lopez from those involving Sanchez and Mohamud to avoid propensity prejudice.
- Trial court denied severance, admitting the other victims’ charged incidents as mutually admissible under Toliver/Johnson and Drew (intent/plan) theories but gave limiting instructions; the court later dismissed some counts at the close of government evidence.
- On appeal the court affirmed Hughes’s convictions related to Lopez but reversed and remanded for new trials the Sanchez misdemeanor conviction and Mohamud counts (two misdemeanors and one destruction-of-property) because joinder prejudiced those lesser trials.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court abused discretion by denying severance of Lopez counts from Sanchez and Mohamud counts | Gov: Evidence of each charged crime was mutually admissible under Toliver/Johnson (context/inextricable linkage) and Drew (intent/common scheme); limiting instruction would protect defendant | Hughes: Joinder created propensity inference; Toliver inapplicable to charged conduct; probative value of Sanchez/Mohamud evidence negligible and outweighed by prejudice | Court: Counts are mutually inextricably linked for context re Lopez; denial of severance was abuse of discretion only insofar as introducing Lopez evidence at separate misdemeanor trials (Sanchez & Mohamud) posed extreme prejudice; affirmed Lopez-side joinder but reversed and remanded Sanchez and Mohamud convictions for new trials |
| Whether evidence was sufficient to support Lopez convictions (first-/second-degree sexual abuse, kidnapping, misdemeanors) | Hughes: Gov failed to prove force, reasonable fear, or confinement; incidents were consensual/horseplay | Gov: Victim testimony, threats to fire, physical grabbing/pushing, DNA evidence, and medical records establish force, fear, confinement, and nonconsent | Court: Evidence viewed in government’s favor was sufficient; convictions relating to Lopez are affirmed |
| Whether introduction of Lopez evidence at separate misdemeanor trials would be harmless | Gov: Any error harmless given strength of evidence | Hughes: Prejudicial effect could not be cured by instruction and would overwhelm juries in lesser trials | Court: Error not harmless — Lopez evidence would likely cause conviction based on disposition; reversed Sanchez and Mohamud misdemeanor convictions |
| Standard for admitting other-crimes evidence (Drew vs Toliver/Johnson interplay) | Gov: Toliver/Johnson allow admission when incidents are inextricably linked or provide context; Drew factors apply alternatively | Hughes: Drew protections required; Toliver limited to uncharged conduct | Court: Toliver/Johnson apply to charged offenses when mutually inextricably linked; Drew still relevant for intent/common scheme analysis; Drew’s heightened safeguards apply when evidence is admitted to prove intent/identity and must be balanced against prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (other-crimes evidence admissible for intent, motive, absence of mistake, common scheme, identity, but requires safeguards against propensity inference)
- Toliver v. United States, 468 A.2d 958 (D.C. 1983) (uncharged conduct inextricably intertwined with charged offense may be admitted to provide immediate context)
- Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087 (D.C. 1996) (clarifies Toliver context test and balancing of probative value against unfair prejudice)
- Arnold v. United States, 511 A.2d 399 (D.C. 1986) (standard for severance when joinder could produce an amalgamated inculpatory mass or where evidence is not mutually admissible)
- Parks v. United States, 656 A.2d 1137 (D.C. 1995) (graphic, more serious other-crimes evidence can overwhelm legitimate probative value in lesser-offense trials)
- Bright v. United States, 698 A.2d 450 (D.C. 1997) (addresses partial harmlessness of misjoinder and when reversal is required for specific counts)
- Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (U.S. 1946) (harmless-error standard: reversal required if error substantially swayed the jury)