Aleta Lilly v. Conagra Foods, Inc.
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3159
| 9th Cir. | 2014Background
- Lilly, on behalf of a proposed class, alleges ConAgra’s sunflower seed packaging misstates sodium by focusing only on kernels, omitting edible shell coating sodium.
- Packages direct consumption of entire shell and kernel together, with shell to be cracked and seed eaten; coating on shells is edible and flavored.
- FDA regulations under NLEA require sodium labeling based on the edible portion of food, not inedible components like shells.
- District court dismissed, holding Lilly’s claims preempted by federal labeling requirements not identical to those in federal law.
- Ninth Circuit reverses: the edible coating sodium must be included; claims are not preempted because they align with federal requirements.
- Court remands for further proceedings on potential deception defenses and summary judgment or trial on factual issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Preemption of state labeling claims | Lilly argues state claims require shell-sodium disclosure not identical to federal rules. | ConAgra maintains NLEA preempts any state requirement not identical to federal labeling. | Not preempted; shell coating sodium must be included |
| Sodium content calculation for edible portion | FDA requires sodium based on edible portion, so edible coating on shells should count. | Only edible portions (kernels) matter under FDA rules; shells and coatings may be excluded. | Edible coating sodium must be counted |
| Deception consideration on motion to dismiss | Labeling could mislead reasonable consumers regarding sodium content. | No reasonable consumer would be deceived since panel focuses on kernels. | Issue is fact-specific; dismissal inappropriate on preemption alone |
Key Cases Cited
- Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011) (text discusses federal preemption and obstacle preemption standard)
- Davis v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 691 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2012) (deference to factual questions in misrepresentation claims; motion to dismiss standard)
- Aguayo v. U.S. Bank, 653 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 2011) (statutory interpretation and preemption principles in banking context)
- Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2009) (preemption and standards for reviewing dismissals)
- Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (classic preemption rationale for federal supremacy in labeling)
- Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 706 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2013) (deception and consumer-protection standards on motion practice)