Aleia Tousis v. Keith Billiot, 84 F.4th 692

DEA placed a GPS tracker on Gus Tousis’s SUV while investigating suspected drug trafficking; agents believed he would visit a source and surveilled the location.
After leaving the location, Tousis fled a traffic stop at extremely high speeds (tracked up to ~115 mph); officers terminated the active pursuit for public safety but continued monitoring his location via the tracker.
Agent Keith Billiot, driving an unmarked car with lights/siren, intercepted Tousis on Central Avenue, pulled in front of Tousis’s vehicle (about 10–25 feet away), exited with a rifle, and issued commands to shut off and exit the car.
Tousis, with his front wheels turned right toward an open lane, pulled the vehicle forward; Billiot fired one shot, striking Tousis in the neck; Tousis’s car crashed and he died; officers later recovered ~300 grams of cocaine.
The district court denied Billiot’s summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity; the Seventh Circuit reviewed de novo, viewing facts in favor of the nonmoving party but treating several concessions as undisputed (vehicle moved forward; distance <25 feet).
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding Billiot was entitled to qualified immunity because existing precedent did not clearly establish that his use of deadly force under these circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Billiot’s shooting violated the Fourth Amendment (excessive force)	Tousis was not an imminent threat and was merely "maneuvering" to evade; Billiot created the dangerous encounter by positioning himself in front of the car	Billiot reasonably perceived the moving vehicle as a deadly threat given prior high-speed flight and short distance	Court did not decide this prong; resolved on clearly-established-law ground in defendant’s favor
Whether law was clearly established that shooting was unlawful here (qualified immunity second prong)	Starks and related authority put Billiot on notice that an officer may not step into a vehicle’s path and then claim deadly-force justification	Controlling precedent (Plumhoff, Tolliver, Garner) supports use of deadly force where officer reasonably believes fleeing driver poses serious threat	Held for Billiot: existing caselaw did not clearly establish his conduct unconstitutional; qualified immunity applies
Whether Starks (officer-created danger) controls	Starks bars deadly force justification when officer’s own actions create the lethal peril	This case differs: Billiot confronted a stationary, blocked vehicle and fired only after the car moved forward toward him	Court distinguished Starks and found it did not place the constitutional question beyond debate

Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014) (Supreme Court: deadly force may be reasonable to prevent escape when suspect poses a serious public safety threat; facts involved resumed flight after pause)
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (Supreme Court: deadly force permissible to prevent escape when officer has probable cause to believe suspect poses a serious threat)
Tolliver v. City of Chicago, 820 F.3d 237 (7th Cir. 2016) (7th Cir.: similar facts—officers on foot within two car lengths; reasonable to view vehicle as deadly weapon; qualified immunity)
Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230 (7th Cir. 1993) (7th Cir.: police-created danger can defeat deadly-force justification; factual sequence may be material)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (Supreme Court: excessive-force claims governed by Fourth Amendment objective-reasonableness standard)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (Supreme Court: two-prong qualified-immunity framework; courts may address either prong first)
Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2003) (7th Cir.: excessive-force analysis depends on totality of circumstances)
Gupta v. Melloh, 19 F.4th 990 (7th Cir. 2021) (7th Cir.: speculation insufficient to create genuine factual dispute on summary judgment)