2020 Ohio 543
Ohio Ct. App.2020Background
- James and Patricia Alcus sued Bainbridge Township and employee Francis Bularz after a backhoe Bularz left parked on an incline rolled backward, injuring James and damaging his vehicle.
- Bularz had idled the backhoe, put it in neutral, lowered the loader bucket, but did not engage the parking brake; the Township’s mechanic later found the brakes functional.
- The Township conceded operator negligence but asserted political-subdivision immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744; the trial court granted summary judgment for the Township and Bularz.
- The Alcuses argued exceptions to immunity applied: (1) R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) (negligence in a proprietary function) and (2) R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) (employee negligence caused by a physical defect on grounds used in connection with a governmental function); they also argued R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) (employee reckless/wanton conduct) defeated Bularz’s immunity.
- The Eleventh District reversed, holding the parking of the backhoe was a proprietary (not governmental) function, the Township failed to carry its burden under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) to reinstate immunity, and genuine issues of fact existed whether Bularz was sued individually and acted recklessly or wantonly.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) applies (governmental vs. proprietary function) | Parking/backhoe operation was a proprietary activity, so immunity exception applies | Activity was maintenance/regulation of public grounds (a specified governmental function) | Held proprietary: parking/parking method was not maintenance of public grounds; service-department maintenance area is not "public grounds" under the statute. |
| Whether R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) applies (physical defect on governmental grounds) | Alternatively, parking method created a physical defect on premises used in connection with a governmental function | Activity did not involve a physical defect and/or premises not "public grounds" | Moot: court found proprietary function, so (B)(4) analysis unnecessary. |
| Whether R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) defense (exercise of discretion) reinstates immunity | Plaintiff: failure to engage parking brake was routine operational negligence, not discretionary protected by (A)(5) | Township: use/non-use of equipment is an exercise of judgment and (A)(5) protects them | Held for plaintiff: (A)(5) construed narrowly; setting parking brake is a routine safety matter, not high-level discretion, and genuine issues exist whether conduct was reckless to defeat immunity. |
| Whether Bularz is personally liable under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) (wanton/reckless) | Complaint alleges Bularz acted negligently, recklessly, and sought punitive damages; factual disputes on awareness of hazard and precautions | Bularz: not sued individually; no evidence of malicious, bad faith, wanton, or reckless conduct | Held for plaintiff: complaint sufficiently pled individual-capacity claims; genuine issues of material fact exist whether Bularz acted recklessly or wantonly—jury must decide. |
Key Cases Cited
- Greene Cty. Agricultural Soc. v. Liming, 89 Ohio St.3d 551 (2000) (explains three-tier R.C. 2744 immunity framework and governmental vs. proprietary function analysis)
- Haverlack v. Portage Homes, Inc., 2 Ohio St.3d 26 (1982) (abolition of common-law sovereign immunity prompted R.C. Chapter 2744)
- Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Fremont, 164 Ohio St. 344 (1955) (definition of "public grounds" as areas established and maintained for and open to the general public)
- Cater v. Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 24 (1998) (holding an indoor municipal swimming pool is "public grounds")
- Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 113 Ohio St.3d 266 (2007) (context on enactment and purpose of Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act)
- Lambert v. Clancy, 125 Ohio St.3d 231 (2010) (scope of employee immunity under R.C. 2744.03)