Alberto Ramos v. Warden, New Hampshire State Prison
155 A.3d 969
| N.H. | 2017Background
- In 1998 Ramos pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and attempted escape under a plea agreement and was sentenced to 28 years to life.
- In April 2013 Ramos was transferred from New Hampshire State Prison to a Florida prison and thereafter filed a habeas corpus petition, later supplemented with an ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim.
- Ramos alleged his trial counsel failed to inform him, before pleading guilty, that he could be transferred to a prison outside New Hampshire.
- The State moved to dismiss; after a telephonic hearing the Superior Court dismissed the IAC claim, concluding out-of-state transfer is a collateral consequence and failure to advise about collateral consequences is not IAC.
- Ramos appealed, arguing Padilla v. Kentucky and State v. Ortiz require Strickland review even for counsel’s failure to warn about collateral consequences like interstate transfer.
- The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed, holding interstate prison transfer is a collateral consequence and Padilla does not eliminate the direct/collateral distinction except for deportation.
Issues
| Issue | Ramos's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether failure of trial counsel to warn that a guilty plea could lead to interstate prison transfer constitutes IAC | Padilla and Ortiz make the direct/collateral distinction inapplicable; Strickland applies and counsel was ineffective if he failed to warn | Interstate transfer is a collateral consequence; failure to advise on collateral consequences does not constitute IAC | Interstate prison transfer is a collateral consequence; Strickland does not apply and counsel’s alleged failure is not constitutionally infirm |
| Whether interstate prison transfer is analogous to deportation (Padilla exception) | Transfer is similarly severe and closely tied to conviction; thus fits Padilla’s reasoning | Transfer lacks the protected liberty interest and is not nearly automatic like deportation; Padilla’s special rule does not apply | Transfer is qualitatively different from deportation; Padilla’s exception does not extend to interstate transfer |
| Whether New Hampshire constitutional protections require a broader rule than federal law | For purposes of appeal Ramos asked the court to adopt Padilla under state constitution and apply it retroactively | State argued existing state precedent distinguishing direct vs. collateral consequences controls | Court assumed arguendo it could adopt Padilla but rejected Ramos’s position on these facts; state and federal protections yield same result |
| Whether Ortiz implicitly overruled prior New Hampshire precedent (Wellington) about counsel and collateral consequences | Ortiz’s dicta allegedly raised counsel’s duties above plea-colloquy duties, undermining Wellington’s rule | Ortiz did not overrule Wellington; Ortiz addressed plea-colloquy due process, not counsel’s standard for collateral consequences | Ortiz did not implicitly overrule prior precedent; Wellington’s rule remains controlling |
Key Cases Cited
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (attorney’s failure to advise about deportation can be IAC; deportation is a special exception to the direct/collateral divide)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-pronged test for IAC: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013) (Padilla did not discard the direct/collateral distinction generally)
- Wellington v. Comm’r, Dept. of Corrections, 140 N.H. 399 (1995) (Strickland inapplicable to counsel’s failure to advise on collateral consequences)
- State v. Ortiz, 163 N.H. 506 (2012) (due process does not require trial courts to advise defendants of immigration consequences; defense counsel duties may differ from plea-colloquy duties)
- Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983) (interstate prison transfer does not implicate a protected liberty interest)