Alberto Mendez-Garcia v. Loretta Lynch
840 F.3d 655
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Petitions by Mendez-Garcia and Rivera-Baltazar sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) based on hardship to their U.S. citizen sons who were under 21 when applications were filed but turned 21 before final agency decisions.
- The BIA applied its precedent (Matter of Isidro-Zamorano) holding qualifying-relative status is assessed at the time the Immigration Judge (IJ) adjudicates the application; both petitioners thus lost eligibility when their sons aged out.
- Mendez-Garcia’s merits hearing was completed but decision reserved due to an annual statutory cap on grants; the IJ issued decision after the son turned 21 and denied relief. He appealed to the BIA, which affirmed.
- Rivera-Baltazar’s case was remanded and experienced multi-year administrative delay; his son turned 21 during pendency and the IJ denied relief; the BIA affirmed and he petitioned for review.
- Court framed issues around (1) statutory interpretation of when qualifying-relative status must exist; (2) binding effect of BIA precedents; (3) whether statutory definitions control; and (4) procedural and substantive due process challenges arising from delays and the statutory cap.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When must an applicant demonstrate a qualifying relative for § 1229b(b)(1)(D)? | Petitioners: qualifying-relative status should be measured at filing (or at close of record), not at decision. | Government/BIA: status is assessed when the IJ adjudicates the application; BIA precedent (Isidro-Zamorano) controls. | Held: BIA’s interpretation is a permissible construction; qualifying-relative status is assessed at the time of the IJ’s decision. |
| Applicability of Isidro-Zamorano to these fact patterns | Petitioners: Isidro-Zamorano is factually distinguishable (e.g., record closed earlier). | Government: BIA precedential interpretations bind and apply beyond original facts. | Held: Agency precedent binds; factual distinctions do not avoid the rule. |
| Which definition of "child" applies? (statutory vs. ordinary meaning) | Petitioners: use ordinary dictionary meaning (“son/daughter”). | Government/BIA: use statutory definition in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (unmarried under 21). | Held: Use the statutory definition; it controls over ordinary meaning. |
| Procedural due process based on delays and cap (including "settled expectations") | Petitioners: agency delays and cap deprived them of fair process and upset settled expectations to obtain relief. | Government: cancellation is discretionary (no protected liberty interest); no entitlement to expedited adjudication; cap and delays didn’t violate due process. | Held: No due process violation—no protected entitlement to discretionary relief or to expedited decision; petitioners were not diligent in seeking expedited review; statutory cap is constitutional. |
Key Cases Cited
- St. Cyr v. INS, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (retroactivity and "settled expectations" in immigration relief)
- Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (two-step test for retroactivity)
- Isidro-Zamorano (Matter of Isidro-Zamorano) is an agency precedent relied on by the BIA (administrative decision; not listed here as it lacks an official reporter citation.)
- Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes are authoritative when reasonable)
- Ruiz-Diaz v. United States, 703 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 2012) (no due process entitlement to expedited adjudication of discretionary relief)
- Singh v. Reno, 182 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 1999) (extraordinary delays may support due process claim when applicant diligently seeks speedier resolution)
- Munoz v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2003) (discretionary relief denial does not implicate substantive due process interest)
- Hyuk Joon Lim v. Holder, 710 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2013) (cancellation is discretionary; no substantive due process interest)
- Hernandez-Mezquita v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2002) (to challenge procedure under due process, alien must show deprivation of a qualifying liberty interest)
- Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (Congress has plenary power over immigration policy)
- Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2003) (ultimate decision to grant discretionary relief rests with Attorney General)