Albert P. Schultz v. United States Postal Service
Background
- Schultz (represented posthumously by counsel/brother) obtained Board relief for disability discrimination and long litigation over back pay and benefits, culminating in a district court award affirmed in part by the Third Circuit.
- Schultz sought attorney fees for work before the Board on the compliance proceedings; he also sought fees for work in district court. The district court initially awarded some fees but later vacated aspects pertaining to Board work on jurisdictional grounds and advised Schultz to seek those fees from the MSPB.
- Schultz filed a fees petition with the Board (challenged as untimely by USPS); the Board remanded after the district court held Schultz was the prevailing party for the compliance matter and ordered the Board to determine fees for Board work.
- On remand, the administrative judge found Schultz prevailing for the compliance matter, set a $250 hourly rate (rejecting $880), disallowed certain clerical/delegable time, and awarded fees and costs; both parties sought review.
- The Board (Final Order) affirmed the award mostly but: (1) declined to revisit timeliness given the district court remand posture; (2) upheld $250/hour as reasonable; (3) reduced billed hours for specific clerical/delegable and non-Board work; (4) reduced the lodestar for 2010–2015 by 20% for partial success, resulting in a total award of $100,733.89 to be paid within 20 days.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of Board fee petition | Schultz contended fees for Board compliance work were properly before the Board and that remand by the district court indicated timeliness | USPS argued the fee petition was filed 502 days late under 5 C.F.R. §1201.203(d) and lacked good cause | Board declined to relitigate timeliness on remand because the district court remanded fee determination to the Board, effectively treating petition as timely for purposes of remand |
| Appropriate hourly rate | Schultz sought up to $880/hr (per fee agreement) or at least an inflation-adjusted/current market rate (Laffey/CLS) | USPS opposed; argued $250/hr (previously accepted by district court) or otherwise not excessive | Board found $250/hr reasonable, relying on district court's earlier rate determination and MSPB standards; rejected retroactive enhancement/interest or tax-offset increase |
| Compensability of claimed hours (clerical, delegable, non-Board work) | Schultz defended many challenged entries as substantive or cost-efficient for counsel to perform | USPS sought disallowance for clerical/delegable tasks and hours devoted to district-court fee litigation or non-Board matters | Board disallowed specific hours: small clerical entries and 23.8 hours attributable to attorney-fee motions/non-Board work (total adjustments detailed in opinion), permitting the remaining hours as reasonable |
| Adjustment of lodestar for partial success and tax offset claim | Schultz sought no reduction and requested a 15% increase to offset tax consequences of lump-sum fee | USPS urged a substantial downward reduction (citing district court's 85% cut) given limited/specific success | Board found Schultz achieved substantial success on compliance claims (district court award including fringe benefits), declined a large reduction for 2001–2005, but reduced the 2010–2015 lodestar by 20% for partial success; rejected tax-offset increase as beyond Board authority |
Key Cases Cited
- Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549 (1988) (Supreme Court decision on interest on back pay against USPS; not a basis to allow interest or rate enhancement on attorney fees)
- Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) (framework for lodestar calculation and adjustments for results obtained)
- Lanni v. State of New Jersey, 259 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 2001) (Third Circuit precedent regarding market rates for fee awards referenced by parties)
- Estate of Schultz v. Potter, [citation="349 F. App'x 712"] (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming district court award of back pay/benefits; background judgment giving rise to fees dispute)