Albert Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville
708 F.3d 549
| 4th Cir. | 2013Background
- Charlottesville amended City Code §28-31 to ban soliciting within 50 feet of Downtown Mall crossings when streets are open to traffic.
- Appellants, five impoverished individuals who beg for funds on the Downtown Mall, challenge the ordinance as a First Amendment content-based restriction on begging.
- District court dismissed for lack of First Amendment violation; it found the ordinance content-neutral time/place/manner regulation.
- Appellants pleaded they regularly beg on the Downtown Mall and are harmed by the ordinance's restrictions on their speech and livelihood.
- The case is reviewed on appeal at the pleadings stage to determine standing and whether the claim is plausibly pleaded.
- The court must decide whether the Downtown Mall is a traditional public forum and whether the content-based restrictions are permissible.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Do Appellants have standing to challenge the ordinance? | Appellants allege concrete injury to First Amendment rights from City’s restriction of begging. | Appellants lack injury-specific pleading about begging within the buffer zones. | Appellants have standing. |
| Is the ordinance content-based or content-neutral, and what framework applies? | Ordinance targets immediate donations and thus content-based; infringes protected speech. | Ordinance is content-neutral because it applies to all solicitations regardless of content. | Ordinance is content-based; strict scrutiny applies, but remand to assess purposes and tailoring at pleadings stage. |
| Is begging on the Downtown Mall protected speech in a traditional public forum warranting strict scrutiny when content-based? | Begging is protected First Amendment speech; Downtown Mall is a traditional public forum. | Regulation may be permissible if narrowly tailored and serves a significant interest. | Begging is protected; Downtown Mall is a traditional public forum; standard to apply depends on content-based analysis. |
| Did the district court err by considering extrinsic evidence (video archives) on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion? | Extrinsic materials cannot be used to determine regulatory purpose at pleading stage. | Public records and legislative history may inform purposes. | District court erred in considering extrinsic materials; case must proceed on pleadings. |
Key Cases Cited
- Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (solicitation of charitable contributions protected speech)
- Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (content-neutral time/place/manner scrutiny framework)
- Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (content-neutral restrictions in a traditional public forum)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires injury, causation, redressability)
- Brown v. Town of Cary, F.3d (2013) (content-neutrality pragmatically evaluated; factors depend on record)
- Wag More Dogs, LLC v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2012) (pleading-stage review; content-based challenge; sufficiency of allegations)
- Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2000) (safety and nuisance interests in speech regulation; contextual inquiry)
- Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995) (legislative history as legislative fact in ordinance review)
- Loper v. New York City Police Dept., 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993) (begging speech treated as protected expression)
- Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954 (11th Cir. 1999) (begging as protected speech under First Amendment)