Albany & Eastern Railroad Co. v. Martell??, 469 P.3d 748

In 1928 Murray conveyed land to a railroad but retained an easement and required the railroad to "construct and maintain a private grade crossing" at an existing private road.
In 1942 Sharinghousen subdivided land east of the tracks into eight Country Lane lots; by 1963 all lots were occupied and the only access to those lots was the crossing at Murray’s easement.
Residents and predecessors used the crossing openly, notoriously, continuously, and without restriction for decades; the railroad maintained the crossing, installed crossbuck signs, and did not post "no trespassing" or "private crossing" notices.
AERC acquired the railroad (2007) and the underlying land (2012), concluded the Country Lane properties had no deeded access, posted private/trespass signs, sought use permits/fees, and sued to quiet title and for trespass.
The trial court found the residents proved a prescriptive easement, applying the common-law presumption of adversity and separately finding actual adversity by clear and convincing evidence; the Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting the presumption because the crossing’s apparent public status would not have put the owner on notice.
The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court: the presumption applied, AERC did not rebut it, and residents have prescriptive easements.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the presumption of adversity applies to long, open, continuous use	Presumption should not apply because the railroad (and predecessor) treated the crossing as public and therefore wouldn’t have been on notice of adverse use	Presumption applies: use was open, notorious, continuous, unmolested, and no evidence of permission or common-road facts to displace it	Presumption of adversity applies; trial court correctly applied it
Whether a landowner’s or user’s mistaken belief that the crossing was public defeats the presumption	Mistaken public designation means owner lacked notice so presumption is unavailable	Subjective misunderstandings are irrelevant; focus is on objectively observable use and owner’s failure to protect rights	Subjective misunderstanding does not defeat presumption; objective acts control and owner’s inaction may foreclose relief
Whether residents’ use was sufficiently adverse (if presumption not applied)	Use did not interfere with railroad use; insurance/maintenance costs insufficient to show adversity	Use was adverse (collision risk, insurance and maintenance costs) and proved by clear and convincing evidence	Even without relying solely on the presumption, evidence supports actual adversity; residents established prescriptive easements

Wels v. Hippe, 360 Or. 569 (Or. 2016) (describes presumption of adversity and recognizes permission and common-road exceptions)
Feldman v. Knapp, 196 Or. 453 (Or. 1952) (long open, continuous, unmolested use gives presumption of right)
Coventon v. Seufert, 23 Or. 548 (Or. 1893) (early statement of presumption for long uninterrupted use)
Thompson v. Scott, 270 Or. 542 (Or. 1974) (elements required for prescriptive easement)
Woods v. Hart, 254 Or. 434 (Or. 1969) (common-road rationale for presumption exceptions)
Evans v. Hogue, 296 Or. 745 (Or. 1984) (tacking doctrine for combining successive users to meet prescriptive period)
Cardenas v. Kurpjuweit, 116 Idaho 739 (Idaho 1989) (claimant’s subjective belief that land is public is irrelevant)
Dunbar v. Heinrich, 95 Wash.2d 20 (Wash. 1980) (adversity measured by objectively observable acts of user and owner)