Alamo Heights Independent School District v. Catherine Clark
544 S.W.3d 755
| Tex. | 2018Background
- Catherine Clark, a female coach at Alamo Heights Junior School, alleged prolonged harassment and bullying by two female colleagues (Ann Monterrubio and Michelle Boyer) during 2007–2009, including vulgar comments, some references to female anatomy, crude conduct at a faculty party, and a single brief instance of being grabbed on the buttocks.
- Clark submitted a detailed May 14, 2008 letter to her principal complaining of many incidents; she later filed an EEOC charge in October 2008 and additional internal grievances; the principal investigated and implemented growth plans for Clark and Monterrubio.
- Alamo Heights investigated Clark’s performance, documented numerous performance deficiencies and policy violations, placed Clark on leave, recommended termination, and fired her in August 2009 after Clark did not request an evidentiary hearing.
- Clark sued the district under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) for same-sex sexual harassment and retaliation. The district filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting lack of evidence of a statutory violation (therefore immunity not waived).
- The court of appeals held Clark had raised prima facie facts on harassment and retaliation; the Texas Supreme Court granted review to resolve (1) whether the evidence shows gender-motivated harassment and (2) whether, for jurisdictional purposes, all McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting elements must be considered when a defendant rebuts the prima facie case.
- The Supreme Court reversed: it held the record, viewed in context, contained no evidence the conduct was motivated by Clark’s gender, and when an employer rebuts the prima facie presumption, the plaintiff must produce some evidence of pretext/causation to invoke the TCHRA waiver.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether alleged same-sex harassment was "because of" sex (TCHRA) | Clark: vulgar, sexualized comments and touching (including comments about breasts/buttocks and a brief grab) show gender-based harassment | Alamo Heights: conduct was crude/indiscriminate bullying toward many employees for non-gender motives (jealousy, personal animus); not motivated by sex | Held: No evidence that conduct was motivated by Clark’s gender; TCHRA harassment claim fails because context shows non-gender motives |
| Whether Clark’s May 14 letter and other internal reports constituted protected activity for retaliation | Clark: her complaints to principal and others put employer on notice of sexual-harassment complaint | Alamo Heights: May 14 letter and earlier complaints lacked indication that conduct was gender-motivated; only the EEOC charge clearly constitutes protected activity | Held: Only the EEOC charge was protected activity; internal complaints did not reasonably alert employer that discrimination based on sex was alleged |
| Whether elements of McDonnell Douglas in a circumstantial-evidence TCHRA case are jurisdictional for immunity-waiver analysis | Clark (and some courts): jurisdictional inquiry limited to prima facie stage when reviewing plea to jurisdiction | Alamo Heights: when defendant rebuts prima facie case, the entire burden-shifting framework becomes relevant to jurisdiction | Held: All elements of a circumstantial-evidence claim are jurisdictional facts; if the prima-facie presumption is rebutted, plaintiff must produce some evidence on pretext/causation to survive jurisdictional plea |
| Whether Clark had to produce evidence of pretext/but-for causation after employer proffered legitimate reasons for termination | Clark: plaintiff’s burden at jurisdictional stage should be minimal; pretext showing reserved for summary judgment/trial | Alamo Heights: once employer rebuts, plaintiff must present evidence raising fact issue that stated reasons are pretext and that adverse action would not have occurred but for protected activity | Held: After rebuttal, Clark was required to present some evidence of pretext/causation; she failed to show but-for causation for growth-plan placement or termination, so immunity was not waived |
Key Cases Cited
- Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination covers same-sex harassment and outlines evidentiary routes for proving gender motivation)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (established burden-shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination cases)
- City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (legal-sufficiency review requires viewing evidence in context and may disregard inferences unreasonable in context)
- Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629 (Tex. 2012) (TCHRA/Texas Labor Code waiver of immunity requires plaintiffs to actually state a claim; prima facie elements are jurisdictional facts)
- Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation when employer articulates legitimate reason)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (retaliation requires materially adverse action that would dissuade a reasonable worker)