Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company v. Chantel Jobes
156 So. 3d 871
| Miss. | 2015Background
- At ~4:42 a.m. on April 19, 2010, Chantel Jobes crossed the center of Hwy. 11 and struck a concrete railroad trestle underpass; she was intoxicated, on prescription benzodiazepines, and severely injured.
- Jobes sued MDOT/Mississippi Transportation Commission (MDOT) and The Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. (AGSR), alleging negligent roadway maintenance, lack of clear zone/shoulder, absence of crash cushions/guardrails, and negligent condition/maintenance of the trestle supports.
- Jobes designated an engineering expert (Fitzgerald) but withdrew him two months before trial and retained no liability expert; she did designate a technical analyst limited to measurements and photos.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment: AGSR argued MDOT had primary responsibility for roadway devices and that Jobes’s impairment was the sole proximate cause; MDOT invoked discretionary-function immunity for placement of traffic-control/protective devices and argued lack of causation.
- The trial court denied summary judgment; on interlocutory appeal the Mississippi Supreme Court reviewed de novo and considered whether Jobes produced evidence on duty, breach, and causation and whether MDOT was immune for discretionary decisions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether MDOT’s maintenance/repair duties are discretionary or ministerial | Jobes: MDOT has mandatory duties to maintain highways; failure to repair/maintain at site caused/ contributed to accident | MDOT: placement of signs, barriers, and protective devices is discretionary (Tort Claims Act immunity); also lack of causation | Duty to maintain/repair is ministerial (Little), but Jobes produced no evidence of specific duty breaches or causation; summary judgment for MDOT on claims lacking proof; discretionary immunity applies to placement/type/location of protective devices under §65-1-175 and §63-3-303 so MDOT immune for those claims |
| Whether MDOT’s placement/maintenance of traffic-control and protective devices is immune from suit | Jobes: MDOT failed to follow standards, signs/edge stripes may have been noncompliant; subsequent installation of attenuators shows prior inadequacy | MDOT: statute vests discretion to determine number/type/location of devices; discretionary-function immunity bars suit | Placement/maintenance of traffic-control/protective devices is discretionary under controlling statutes; MDOT immune under §11-46-9(1)(d) |
| Whether AGSR owes a continuing common-law duty to maintain trestle/columns and post warnings | Jobes: AGSR’s trestle columns are unprotected, close to roadway, unlit, and create danger as traffic speeds/volume increased; AGSR must adapt | AGSR: any common-law duty has been superseded by MDOT’s exclusive jurisdiction over roadway/railroad crossings under §65-1-175; Jobes lacks evidence of specific duty, breach, or causation | Any AGSR common-law duty to maintain/ warn at crossings has been displaced by MDOT’s exclusive jurisdiction; Jobes presented no evidence of duty/breach/causation; summary judgment for AGSR |
| Whether Jobes presented sufficient evidence of causation to defeat summary judgment | Jobes: problems at site (potholes, lack of edge stripe, standing water) could have contributed; later MDOT changes imply prior defect contributed | Defendants: expert affidavits tie accident to Jobes’s intoxication/impairment; plaintiff has no liability expert and her own testimony offers only speculation | Jobes provided no expert or admissible evidence establishing that roadway/trestle conditions caused or materially contributed to the crash or its severity; summary judgment warranted |
Key Cases Cited
- Little v. Mississippi Department of Transportation, 129 So. 3d 132 (Miss. 2013) (MDOT’s statutory duty to maintain highways is ministerial unless another statute makes the act discretionary)
- Miss. Transp. Comm’n v. Montgomery, 80 So. 3d 789 (Miss. 2012) (distinguishing discretionary vs. ministerial functions under Tort Claims Act)
- Conrod v. Holder, 825 So. 2d 16 (Miss. 2002) (standard for summary judgment review)
- Harrison v. Chandler-Sampson, Ins., Inc., 891 So. 2d 224 (Miss. 2005) (de novo review of summary-judgment denial)
- Travis v. Stewart, 680 So. 2d 214 (Miss. 1996) (nonmovant cannot survive summary judgment with bare allegations)
- Sligh v. First Nat’l Bank of Holmes Co., 735 So. 2d 963 (Miss. 1999) (summary judgment required when essential element lacks evidence)
- Kroger Co. v. Knox, 98 So. 3d 441 (Miss. 2012) (plaintiff must prove duty, breach, and proximate cause)
- Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Farris, 259 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1958) (railroad’s historical common-law duty to construct trestles to afford sufficient clearance to vehicles)
- Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 807 So. 2d 382 (Miss. 2001) (expert testimony not required where negligence facts are within jury comprehension)