Al L. Burgess v. State of Florida
182 So. 3d 841
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Appellant Al L. Burgess filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800 motion to correct an illegal sentence challenging his designation as a habitual violent felony offender (HVFO) on life felonies of armed kidnapping and armed sexual battery.
- The trial court granted the motion in part by striking Burgess’s HVFO designation on those counts but denied Burgess’s request for resentencing, stating the denial was "without prejudice."
- Burgess argued he was entitled to a resentencing hearing at which he would be present and represented by counsel because striking the HVFO designation required reapplying the sentencing law in effect at the time of the offenses.
- The State did not dispute the propriety of striking the HVFO designations for crimes committed during the statutory "window period" when Chapter 95-182 was held unconstitutional.
- The Fourth District considered whether resentencing following correction of an illegal HVFO classification is a ministerial act (no hearing required) or a discretionary judicial act (requiring defendant’s presence and counsel).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether HVFO designations should be stricken for offenses committed during the window period | Burgess: HVFO designations invalid due to Chapter 95-182 being declared unconstitutional for the window period | State: did not contest striking HVFO for that period | Court: HVFO designations properly struck for those counts (citing window-period precedent) |
| Whether resentencing is required after striking HVFO designations | Burgess: resentencing required under the sentencing laws in effect at time of offense | State: trial court denied resentencing (implicitly treating resentencing as not required or only ministerial) | Court: resentencing required because judge has discretion under applicable guidelines |
| Whether resentencing is ministerial (no presence/counsel) or judicial (presence/counsel required) | Burgess: resentencing is not ministerial; he must be present and have counsel | State: trial court treated resentencing as unnecessary at present | Court: resentencing is not ministerial; defendant must be present and represented unless act truly ministerial |
| Scope of remand and sentencing options on remand | Burgess: seeks full resentencing under controlling law | State: trial court may have flexibility | Court: remand for resentencing; trial court may impose departure sentences if valid grounds proven |
Key Cases Cited
- Cook v. State, 866 So. 2d 1291 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (window-period precedent invalidating HVFO application)
- Hankerson v. State, 765 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (window-period precedent)
- Lewis v. State, 764 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (remanding for sentences under law at time of offense)
- Austin v. State, 756 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (window-period precedent)
- Jordan v. State, 143 So. 3d 335 (Fla. 2014) (resentencing after correcting illegal HVFO designation is not ministerial; defendant entitled to be present and have counsel)
- Thompson v. State, 987 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (trial court must reconsider sentences under sentencing laws in effect at time of offense)