Akers v. State
2015 Ark. App. 352
| Ark. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Akers, a high-school English teacher and extracurricular advisor, had a sexual relationship with A.C. that began when she was 15 and continued into her later teens; A.C. became pregnant and bore Akers’ child.
- Sexual activity occurred on school premises (classroom), and Akers wrote notes excusing A.C.’s tardiness.
- Akers was charged with first-degree sexual assault under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-124(a)(3) (employee of the victim’s school) and fourth-degree sexual assault (adult 20+ with minor under 16).
- At trial Akers moved for directed verdict claiming insufficient evidence that he used a position of trust/authority and argued the statute was unconstitutional as applied (privacy and equal protection). Motions were denied.
- Akers proffered two jury instructions (requiring proof he used a position of trust/authority; and permitting alternative sentencing of probation/house arrest); the court refused both.
- Jury convicted; sentenced to 19 years (first-degree) and 6 years (fourth-degree) plus fines. Ark. Ct. App. affirmed on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Akers’ Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency: whether statute requires proof appellant used position of trust/authority to cause sexual intercourse | Akers: Insufficient evidence he used a position of trust/authority; statute must be read to require use of authority | State: § 5-14-124(a)(3) is written in the disjunctive; employment in victim’s school is itself a sufficient statutory basis | Court: Affirmed — proof of employment in victim’s school district is sufficient; additional proof of use of authority not required |
| Constitutional: whether applying § 5-14-124(a)(3) to a teacher’s sexual relationship with a minor violates right to privacy | Akers: Statute criminalizes otherwise legal activity based solely on teacher status, infringing privacy (and implicating equal protection) | State: Protecting minors from adults with institutional access/authority is a legitimate state interest; statute is rationally related to that interest | Court: Rejected privacy/equal-protection challenge; Paschal inapposite because that case involved consenting adults; statute upheld |
| Jury instruction (elements): whether court erred by refusing instruction adding element that Akers used position of trust/authority | Akers: Jury must find he used trust/authority to influence A.C. | State: Statute does not require that element; instruction would misstate law | Court: No error — instruction properly refused |
| Jury instruction (alternative sentencing): whether court erred by refusing instruction allowing probation/house arrest | Akers: Jury should have had option to impose alternative, non-prison sentence | State: Court discretion to refuse; no prejudice shown | Court: No abuse of discretion; refusal not reversible (jury gave sentence above minimum) |
Key Cases Cited
- Smoak v. State, 2011 Ark. 529 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- State v. V.H., 2013 Ark. 344 (statutory construction: disjunctive statutory elements sufficient when proved)
- Smith v. State, 354 Ark. 226 (upholding school-employee classification as rationally related to protecting minors from authority figures)
- Paschal v. State, 2012 Ark. 127 (privacy challenge successful where victim was a consenting adult; limited to adult-adult private sexual intimacy)
- Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600 (discussion of constitutional protection for private consensual sexual intimacy)
- Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (recognition of privacy interests in adult consensual sexual conduct)