Ainsworth v. Chandler and Chandler Electric Company, Chandler v. Concord Group Insurance Company and Campbell & Boyd Insurance Services
197 Vt. 541
Vt.2014Background
- On May 17, 2009, Faye Ainsworth visited Charles Chandler at his business (Chandler Electric); she later alleged she tripped on a coil of wire near a stairway and suffered serious injuries.
- Ainsworth and Chandler were romantically involved at the time (later married); Ainsworth also purchased smoke detectors that day and claimed both social and business purposes for the visit.
- Chandler separately sued his insurer (Concord) in March 2010, alleging bad-faith refusal to provide coverage; Concord intervened after Ainsworth sued Chandler in August 2010 and later moved for summary judgment in the tort case.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Chandler (finding Ainsworth a social guest/licensee and that Chandler did not breach his lesser duty) and later granted summary judgment for Concord on the basis that the underlying claim was dismissed.
- On appeal the Vermont Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment to Chandler (holding Ainsworth raised genuine issues under ordinary negligence) and reversed the insurer’s summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ainsworth was a social guest (licensee) or business invitee | Ainsworth argued she was also a customer and thus an invitee | Chandler argued her primary purpose was social, making her a licensee owed lesser duty | Court: Entrant-status is no longer controlling; remanded to apply ordinary negligence standard per Demag; factual status can be considered but not dispositive |
| Applicable duty of care / standard for premises liability | Ordinary negligence (reasonable care under all circumstances); status is one factor | Lesser duty for licensees: only to refrain from active negligence; if licensee no duty to warn of open-and-obvious hazards | Court: Abrogated invitee/licensee distinction (Demag); apply ordinary negligence; plaintiff raised triable issues on duty and breach |
| Whether the piled coils of wire constituted an open-and-obvious hazard precluding liability | Ainsworth said she did not see wire in the stairway and alleged poor lighting/debris; thus hazard may not have been open/obvious or foreseeable | Chandler/insurer argued wire was clearly visible and risk obvious, so no duty to warn or act | Court: Genuine factual dispute exists on whether hazard was open-and-obvious or foreseeable; summary judgment improper |
| Whether Chandler’s separate suit against insurer and insurer’s summary judgment were properly resolved as moot | Ainsworth: N/A (focus on tort claim) | Chandler argued trial court’s error on underlying summary judgment made insurer’s mootness ruling incorrect | Court: Because underlying tort summary judgment reversed, insurer’s summary judgment and dismissal of Chandler’s suit were reversed and remanded for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Farnham v. Inland Sea Resort Props., Inc., 175 Vt. 500, 824 A.2d 554 (Vt. 2003) (status-based distinctions in premises-liability usually present questions for the factfinder)
- Menard v. Lavoie, 174 Vt. 479, 806 A.2d 1004 (Vt. 2002) (contrast of invitee/licensee duties and application where hazard was obvious)
- Endres v. Endres, 185 Vt. 63, 968 A.2d 336 (Vt. 2008) (nonmovant’s burden to produce evidence to defeat summary judgment)
- Ball v. Melsur Corp., 161 Vt. 35, 633 A.2d 705 (Vt. 1993) (presumption of judicial integrity; burden on movant to show bias)
- Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (U.S. 1994) (judicial rulings ordinarily do not constitute bias requiring recusal)