892 F.3d 25
1st Cir.2018Background
- William H. Cosby, Jr. was sued in multiple defamation actions by several women who had accused him of sexual assault; Cosby denied the accusations and allegedly made defamatory statements.
- Cosby held two AIG policies: a homeowners policy and a personal excess (umbrella) policy; both defined "personal injury" to include defamation and obligated AIG to defend suits seeking covered damages.
- AIG initially defended under a reservation of rights and then filed this declaratory-judgment action seeking to avoid defense/indemnity under "sexual misconduct" exclusions in both policies.
- The homeowners exclusion barred coverage for claims "arising out of any actual, alleged, or threatened ... sexual molestation, misconduct or harassment"; the umbrella policy had a materially broader separate exclusion applying to claims "arising out of, or in any way involving, directly or indirectly, any alleged sexual misconduct."
- The district court treated Cosby’s motion as for judgment on the pleadings and held that the exclusions were at least ambiguous, creating a duty to defend; AIG appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (AIG) | Defendant's Argument (Cosby) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether AIG has a duty to defend Cosby against the defamation suits | The defamation claims "arise out of" Cosby’s alleged sexual misconduct, so exclusions bar defense | The alleged injury stems from defamatory statements, an independent source, so exclusions do not apply | Court affirmed duty to defend (ambiguity resolved for insured) |
| Proper meaning of "arising out of" in the exclusions | Should be read broadly (but-for causation) to capture denials prompted by alleged misconduct | Should be read more narrowly (sufficiently close/causal link required) | Court found ambiguity; context (umbrella policy language) supports reading closer to proximate causation or ambiguous |
| Effect of differing exclusion language across policies issued by same insurer | No material difference; exclusions should be read to achieve insurer’s intent to exclude related claims | Discrepancy creates ambiguity that favors insured | Court relied on the broader umbrella exclusion’s wording to find ambiguity in the general exclusion, favoring insured |
| Choice of law (Massachusetts vs. California) | Massachusetts law should apply and yield no coverage | California law applies or otherwise estop AIG from invoking Massachusetts | Court applied Massachusetts law (as AIG requested) and still found a duty to defend; did not resolve choice-of-law dispute further |
Key Cases Cited
- Brazas Sporting Arms, Inc. v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 220 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000) (contract interpretation begins with policy language)
- Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Field, 670 F.3d 93 (1st Cir. 2012) (insurer bears burden to show exclusion; ambiguities construed against insurer)
- Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Torres, 561 F.3d 74 (1st Cir. 2009) (ambiguous policy terms construed in favor of insured)
- Commerce Ins. Co. v. Ultimate Livery Serv., Inc., 897 N.E.2d 50 (Mass. 2008) ("arising out of" indicates broader causation than proximate cause)
- Fuller v. First Fin. Ins. Co., 858 N.E.2d 288 (Mass. 2006) ("arising out of" suggests but-for causation)
- Rischitelli v. Safety Ins. Co., 671 N.E.2d 1243 (Mass. 1996) ("arising out of" requires a sufficiently close/"reasonably apparent" causal relationship)
- Am. Home Assur. Co. v. First Specialty Ins. Corp., 894 N.E.2d 1167 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (placement along causation continuum requires judgment)
- Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Cotter, 984 N.E.2d 835 (Mass. 2013) (every contract term must be given effect; duty to defend broader than duty to indemnify)
- Bagley v. Monticello Ins. Co., 720 N.E.2d 813 (Mass. 1999) (duty to defend depends on source from which injury originates)
- U.S. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Benchmark Const. Servs., Inc., 797 F.3d 116 (1st Cir. 2015) (exclusionary provisions construed strictly against insurer)
- Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Robert S., 28 P.3d 889 (Cal. 2001) (ambiguities resolved for insured)
- Palmer v. Truck Ins. Exch., 988 P.2d 568 (Cal. 1999) (give effect to each policy clause; clauses interpret each other)
