Ahmad Nurriddin v. Charles Bolden
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6174
| D.C. Cir. | 2016Background
- Ahmad Nurriddin, an African‑American Muslim NASA employee, worked in the Education Affairs Division and filed multiple EEO complaints from 1997–2004 alleging race/disability discrimination and retaliation.
- He received an Outstanding rating in 1996 and a non‑competitive promotion to GS‑13 in 1997, but continued to dispute performance ratings, awards, travel denials, within‑grade increase (WGI) denial, AWOL designation, donated leave handling, and a 2004 termination as medically unable to work.
- Between 1998–2000 he experienced depression, anxiety, and back pain, took leave, was detailed to NSF for a year (performance praised there), then largely stopped working at NASA after 2000.
- NASA repeatedly considered reassignments, offered a position in 2001 (later found unsuitable by OWCP), conducted job searches, and in Feb. 2004 terminated him for medical inability to perform duties to promote efficiency of service.
- Procedurally: District Court dismissed Rehabilitation Act claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and granted summary judgment for NASA on Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims; the D.C. Circuit affirms in part and grants summary judgment for NASA on remaining Title VII claims, but a dissent would have reversed as to the 1999 performance‑award claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Nurriddin pleaded a qualifying disability or was "regarded as" disabled under the Rehabilitation Act | Nurriddin asserted major depression and back pain caused by workplace harassment and alleged NASA perceived him as disabled | NASA argued factual allegations show limits only in his particular job and demonstrate he could perform other positions (e.g., NSF detail), so no statutory disability | Affirmed dismissal: complaint fails to allege substantial limitation in a major life activity or that NASA regarded him as disabled broadly enough to state a Rehabilitation Act claim |
| Whether discrete Title VII claims (travel denials, AWOL designation, WGI timing, donated leave) create triable issues of discrimination or retaliation | Nurriddin claimed those acts were discriminatory/retaliatory incidents tied to his protected status and EEO activity | NASA produced nondiscriminatory explanations and pointed to lack of record evidence contradicting them | Affirmed summary judgment: plaintiff offered only conclusory assertions or inadmissible hearsay, no admissible evidence from which a jury could infer discrimination/retaliation |
| Whether denial/size of promotions and performance awards (1998 promotion, $800 award, and 1999 denial) were discriminatory or pretextual | Nurriddin argued awards/promotions were withheld or minimized because of race/retaliation and pointed to managerial comments and successful NSF work | NASA proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons: no accretion‑of‑duty justification, management evaluations citing missed deadlines/unresponsiveness, and that details/NSF did not yield awards | Summary judgment affirmed for 1998 issues and the 1998 $800 award (no causal link or admissible direct evidence). Dissent would reverse as to 1999 award, viewing HR testimony and contradictory explanations as sufficient for a jury |
| Whether 2004 termination was discriminatory or retaliatory | Nurriddin claimed a long‑running conspiracy and that a 2001 tactical email and earlier events show discriminatory/retaliatory motive leading to termination | NASA showed long work absence since 2000, fresh decisionmakers (Houston/Diaz) who were uninvolved in earlier disputes, unsuccessful job searches, and a need to promote efficiency; decision tied to medical inability to perform duties | Affirmed summary judgment: record does not permit a reasonable jury to infer discrimination or retaliation, temporal gap and substitute decisionmakers undercut causation/inference of illicit motive |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility standard for Rule 12(b)(6) pleadings)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must be plausible, not merely conceivable)
- Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 456 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (plaintiff may plead himself out of court by alleging facts that make recovery impossible)
- Duncan v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 240 F.3d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (definition of "substantially limits" in ability to work)
- Adams v. Rice, 531 F.3d 936 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (discussing "major life activities" and Rehabilitation Act/ADA frameworks)
- Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (at summary judgment the prima facie framework is part of the total evidence; pretext standard)
- Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (the ‘‘one central inquiry’’ at summary judgment: whether a reasonable jury could infer discrimination from the record)
- Douglas v. Donovan, 559 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (denial of discretionary bonus can be an adverse action)