Aguirre v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
3:21-cv-00244
D. Conn.Mar 23, 2022Background
- Plaintiff Joey A. filed concurrent DIB and SSI applications on August 18, 2017, amending his alleged onset date to January 1, 2016.
- Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Deirdre R. Horton held a hearing on January 8, 2020, and issued an unfavorable decision on March 4, 2020; the Appeals Council denied review, making that the Commissioner’s final decision.
- The ALJ found severe impairments of multiple sclerosis (MS) and degenerative disc disease, but concluded plaintiff had the RFC for light work with limits (including standing/walking 4 hours/8-hour day and postural/environmental restrictions).
- The ALJ gave limited persuasiveness to treating neurologist Dr. Kenneth Fischer and treating physical therapist MPT Jeanine Hrabosky; she found the reconsideration-level state agency opinion (Dr. Chopra) persuasive.
- Plaintiff challenged the ALJ’s medical-opinion evaluations and the RFC as unsupported by substantial evidence; he sought reversal or remand. The district court denied relief and affirmed the Commissioner.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the ALJ improperly evaluated treating/therapy source opinions (Dr. Fischer, MPT Hrabosky) | ALJ failed to give proper weight; ignored or mischaracterized treatment relationship and findings | ALJ permissibly applied the post‑2017 opinion-regulations, discussed supportability and consistency, and cited treatment records | Court: ALJ’s persuasiveness findings were supported by substantial evidence; no reversible error |
| Whether the reconsideration-level state agency opinion was stale given later records | Later hearing-level records (PT notes, new provider notes, MSS) show deterioration, so the consultant’s opinion is stale | The later records did not undermine Dr. Chopra’s conclusions; many later items either were considered, lacked functional assessment, or were consistent | Court: Dr. Chopra’s opinion remained supported by the overall record; no error in relying on it |
| Whether the RFC (light work; stand/walk 4 hrs) is unsupported—strength vs. endurance and assistive device use | ALJ conflated momentary 4/5 strength findings with sustained endurance; failed to account for cane/crutches and post‑2019 ambulation limits | ALJ relied on state consultant, medical record showing primarily left‑leg deficits, treatment history, and activities; medical necessity for assistive device not shown pre‑late‑2019; VE testified past work tolerable with a cane/crutches | Court: RFC is supported by substantial evidence; any omission re: assistive device was harmless because VE said past work remained available |
| Whether ALJ improperly discounted MS treatment/refused treatment or selectively reviewed records | ALJ mischaracterized plaintiff’s treatment choices and impermissibly cherry‑picked favorable evidence | ALJ permissibly considered conservative treatment, failure to pursue recommended interventions, and addressed key records without needing to mention every item | Court: ALJ’s consideration of treatment and the record was appropriate; no reversible error |
Key Cases Cited
- Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770 (2d Cir. 1999) (two-step review: correct legal standard then substantial evidence)
- Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (U.S. 1971) (definition and application of substantial evidence)
- Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1987) (legal error by ALJ can deprive claimant of correct adjudication)
- Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1984) (ALJ must set forth crucial factors with sufficient specificity)
- Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1988) (credibility findings require specific support to permit meaningful review)
- Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2012) (court’s review limited to checking substantial evidence and proper legal standard)
- Poupore v. Astrue, 566 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2009) (burden shift at step five of sequential analysis)
- Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402 (2d Cir. 2010) (harmless error doctrine where vocational testimony shows same result)
