Aguilera v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 1:15-cv-20406

Background

Aguilera was tried for the fatal shooting of Ignacio Ramirez; defense conceded at trial that Aguilera hit the victim with a gun which accidentally discharged. Jury convicted him of second-degree murder, aggravated battery (firearm), and using/displaying a firearm during a felony; split sentences imposed including a 25‑year minimum on the firearm count.
Aguilera pursued direct appeal (affirmed), then filed a Rule 3.850 post‑conviction motion; the trial court vacated one count (aggravated battery with baton) but denied other claims; the Third DCA granted a belated 3.850 appeal and later affirmed the denial of remaining claims.
Aguilera filed a § 2254 habeas petition raising (inter alia) ineffective assistance for failing to object to a manslaughter-by-act jury instruction, ineffective assistance for plea‑advice that led him to reject a 20‑year offer, double jeopardy as to firearm counts, and cumulative error.
The magistrate analyzed AEDPA timeliness (addressing whether a post‑conviction modification restarted the limitations period), exhaustion and procedural default (finding some claims abandoned on collateral appeal), and the merits under Strickland/Frye/Lafler standards.
Recommended disposition: federal relief denied—several claims held procedurally defaulted (abandoned on state collateral appeal), claims challenging the manslaughter instruction and plea advice rejected on the merits, double‑jeopardy claim already granted relief in state post‑conviction, no evidentiary hearing warranted, and no certificate of appealability.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Effective assistance — manslaughter jury instruction	Counsel ineffective for not objecting to erroneous manslaughter‑by‑act instruction (Montgomery error) and failing to preserve; caused due process violation	Instruction was lawfully given at trial date; counsel not ineffective for failing to anticipate later Florida Supreme Court decision; Hankerson inapplicable	Denied — no Strickland deficiency; state courts’ rejection reasonable
Effective assistance — plea advice	Counsel misadvised Aguilera about maximum/minimum exposure and over‑confidently steered him to reject a 20‑year offer; would have accepted plea but for advice	Record shows Aguilera was told manslaughter could carry up to 30 years and was aware of 10/20/life risk; counsel’s strategy to pursue manslaughter was reasonable; Aguilera maintained unwillingness to plead guilty to murder	Denied — no prejudice under Frye/Lafler; counsel not deficient
Double jeopardy (firearm counts)	Conviction for second‑degree murder with firearm and separate firearm use count violate double jeopardy	State had already granted relief on related post‑conviction claim; claim addressed in state proceedings	Not entitled to further relief in federal habeas (claim already granted in state post‑conviction)
Exhaustion / Procedural default	Some claims preserved for federal review	Petitioner abandoned claims by failing to raise them in initial post‑conviction appellate brief	Claims (1), (2), (8) found unexhausted and procedurally defaulted (abandoned); not reached on merits

Key Cases Cited

Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010) (judgment comprises conviction and sentence; determines when a petition is successive)
Insignares v. Secretary, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2014) (when a new judgment exists, a first habeas petition challenging it is not "second or successive")
State v. Montgomery, 39 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 2010) (Florida Supreme Court: standard manslaughter‑by‑act jury instruction was fundamentally erroneous for including intent)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) (duty of counsel to communicate plea offers; prejudice framework for rejected plea offers)
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (remedies and prejudice analysis where deficient counsel advice leads to rejection of plea)