Aguilar v. the State
340 Ga. App. 522
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Defendant Jose Luis Aguilar, Jr. convicted after jury trial of one count of cruelty to a child in the first degree and two counts of sexual battery (as lesser-included offenses of aggravated child molestation); acquitted on several other counts.
- Victim A.A., Aguilar’s daughter, made an outcry in 2011 alleging sexual abuse beginning at age nine and continuing; Aguilar denied sexual contact.
- At trial the State introduced evidence of Aguilar’s prior sexual relationship with A.A.’s mother, who was 14 when she became pregnant; the State sought to use that relationship as similar-transaction evidence.
- Aguilar requested a lesser-included charge of sexual battery; the court’s sexual-battery instruction omitted lack-of-consent as an element.
- Aguilar moved to sever the cruelty count, sought continuance after the State was allowed to argue motive/intent based on similar-transaction evidence, attempted to offer good-character testimony, and objected to multiple expert witnesses as cumulative.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Aguilar) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jury instruction: sexual battery omitted lack of consent | Instruction omitted lack-of-consent element; error requiring reversal | No objection at trial; invited the lesser-included instruction; consent not an issue | Court finds plain error: omission of lack of consent was erroneous; reverses convictions on two sexual-battery counts |
| Severance of cruelty-to-child count | Joinder prejudiced Aguilar; law/evidence for cruelty distinct and should be tried separately | Same evidence supported cruelty and other counts; severance not required | Denial of severance affirmed; evidence overlapped and would be admissible in separate trials |
| Admission/use of prior-bad-act (relationship with mother) evidence | Such evidence was improper as to cruelty count and prejudicial | Similar-transaction evidence admissible in child-molestation prosecutions and relevant to motive/intent and cruelty | Admission and use of the evidence upheld as relevant and admissible under OCGA § 24-4-414 |
| Request for continuance after State’s motion to argue motive/intent | Denial prevented fair preparation to contest the similar-transaction evidence | State had given pretrial notice; court had left matter open; no surprise or proffer of what additional evidence Aguilar would present | Denial of continuance not an abuse of discretion; no showing of prejudice |
| Exclusion of good-character evidence on maliciousness element | Court barred evidence of good parenting/character that would negate maliciousness | Aguilar failed to proffer specifics about excluded testimony or witnesses | No reversible error: defendant did not make a proper proffer, and general parenting testimony wouldn’t refute sexual-abuse predicate acts |
| Cumulative expert bolstering evidence | Multiple experts constituted impermissible cumulative bolstering of victim credibility | Expert testimony admissible; experts performed different roles; such testimony is proper | No error: testimony not unduly cumulative and was permissible to explain findings |
Key Cases Cited
- Watson v. State, 297 Ga. 718 (court reversed sexual-battery conviction where lack-of-consent element was not properly charged)
(holding that actual proof of lack of consent is required even when victim is under 16) - Miller v. State, 289 Ga. 854 (addresses when reading the indictment can cure a failure to charge an essential element)
(contrast on whether indictment reading saves an omitted jury instruction) - Shepherd v. State, 217 Ga. App. 893 (discusses invited error doctrine regarding requested instructions)
(State relied on this to argue Aguilar invited the instruction) - Hunt v. State, 336 Ga. App. 821 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence and other trial rulings)
(used for stating the view-most-favorable-to-the-verdict standard and for reviewing objections) - Machiavello v. State, 308 Ga. App. 772 (severance standard and discretion on joinder of offenses)
(articulates when denial of severance is appropriate)