Aguilar-Santos v. Briner
2017 IL App (1st) 153593
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Aguilar-Santos sued Briner for negligence after a 2008 car accident; the trial court granted partial summary judgment on liability and defendant admitted negligence but disputed injury extent and permanency.
- Plaintiff disclosed treating physicians (Dr. Lim, Dr. Malek) under Ill. S. Ct. Rule 213; supplemental disclosures appended a November 2011 MRI showing a C5-6 herniated disc and a 2012 office note by Dr. Lim.
- At trial plaintiff testified to ongoing neck/back pain, multiple epidural injections, periodic improvement, long gaps in treatment, continuing prescription medication costs, and that she declined surgery; Dr. Lim and neurosurgeon Dr. Malek testified the accident aggravated preexisting degenerative changes and produced a herniated disc and a permanent condition (MMI) absent surgery.
- Defense expert Dr. Bernstein opined plaintiff’s post-2009 symptoms were degenerative and not causally related to the accident; parties stipulated $95,548.04 past medical expenses but defendant admitted only $35,851.11 through March 25, 2009 were related to the accident.
- Jury awarded $1,301,048.04 (including $370,000 future medical expenses and other awards for past/future pain and loss of normal life); court denied defendant’s posttrial motion for new trial/remittitur; defendant appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Dr. Lim’s causation opinion connecting the accident to the 2011 herniated disc (Rule 213) | Dr. Lim was disclosed as a treating physician who would testify that injuries/symptoms in records were caused by the accident and would update opinion; supplement included the 2011 MRI review—so the trial testimony was a logical corollary and not new. | The opinion that the accident caused the herniated disc was a new opinion not disclosed before the 2011 MRI and therefore violated Rule 213; defense surprised. | Affirmed: trial testimony was a logical corollary to disclosures and supplemental records; admission not an abuse of discretion. |
| Admissibility of Dr. Malek’s prognosis/permanency opinion (Decker standard) | Dr. Malek’s testimony that plaintiff reached MMI and condition is permanent was supported by his treatment, records, contemporaneous symptoms and response to treatment; recency/gaps go to weight, not admissibility. | Dr. Malek saw plaintiff only six times over two years and last saw her 15+ months before his deposition; opinions on permanency lacked foundation and were speculative. | Affirmed: court properly applied Decker factors; recency/frequency relevant but not dispositive; testimony admissible and jury to weigh it. |
| Award for future medical expenses (evidence and sufficiency) | Plaintiff testified to current monthly prescription costs; experts testified condition unlikely to resolve without surgery which plaintiff did not plan to have; reasonable to infer ongoing future expense and use mortality table for duration. | No Rule 213 disclosure of a specific future-expense claim amount; no expert calculated future medication costs or duration—award speculative. | Affirmed: plaintiff’s testimony plus medical testimony made future expenses provable without expert computation; $370,000 for future care supported by evidence and life-expectancy table. |
| Whether the jury verdict was against manifest weight / whether remittitur or new trial required | Plaintiff argued evidence supported causation, permanency, and future expense awards; jury reasonably credited treating experts and plaintiff’s testimony. | Defendant argued awards excessive/speculative (esp. future items) and verdict premised on improperly admitted causation for the herniated disc. | Affirmed: verdict fell within flexible range supported by evidence; no abuse of discretion in denying new trial or remittitur. |
Key Cases Cited
- Decker v. Libell, 193 Ill.2d 250 (Ill. 2000) (factors for admitting prognosis/permanency testimony by physician)
- Sullivan v. Edward Hospital, 209 Ill.2d 100 (Ill. 2004) (expert testimony disclosure under Rule 213 and avoidance of surprise)
- Rainey v. City of Salem, 209 Ill. App.3d 898 (Ill. App. 1991) (future medical expenses may be proven without expert computation when nature of disability supports inference)
- Briante v. Link, 184 Ill. App.3d 812 (Ill. App. 1989) (remittitur where no evidence supported specific future-treatment cost/duration)
- Diaz v. Legat Architects, Inc., 397 Ill. App.3d 13 (Ill. App. 2009) (upholding future medical expense award where past bills and life expectancy supported projection)
- Spaetzel v. Dillon, 393 Ill. App.3d 806 (Ill. App. 2009) (expert testimony at trial may be permissible if an elaboration or logical corollary of disclosed opinion)
- Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill.2d 445 (Ill. 1992) (standard for new trial when verdict is against manifest weight)
- Redmond v. Socha, 216 Ill.2d 622 (Ill. 2005) (review of denial of new trial for abuse of discretion)
- Kindernay v. Hillsboro Area Hospital, 366 Ill. App.3d 559 (Ill. App. 2006) (standards on remittitur and excessive verdicts)