Agnew v. D'Amore, 6:23-cv-01610

Amy Jane Agnew, a female civil rights attorney, represents inmates including a large class in ongoing prisoner rights litigation.
Agnew was barred from conducting contact visits with her incarcerated clients at Marcy Correctional Facility, a men’s facility, based on allegations of sexually inappropriate conduct.
She alleges the real reasons for the restrictions were retaliation for her legal advocacy against prison officials and sex discrimination.
Male attorneys who engaged in similar conduct (e.g., hugging clients) were not similarly sanctioned.
Agnew filed a § 1983 action claiming First Amendment retaliation, and violations of her Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights (sex discrimination and selective enforcement/class-of-one theories).
Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6); the court denied the motion, allowing all claims to proceed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
First Amendment Retaliation	Actions were motivated by Agnew's protected legal advocacy and free speech on prison matters.	No causal connection or injury (no chilling effect) between advocacy and restrictions.	Motion to dismiss denied; claim plausible.
Sex Discrimination (Equal Protection)	Barred from contact visits due to sex; male attorneys not subject to same sanctions for same conduct.	No adequate pleading of disparate treatment or comparators; no identified similarly situated male.	Motion to dismiss denied; claim plausible.
Selective Enforcement/Class-of-One	Targeted in enforcement (restriction, false claims) due to sex and advocacy; male lawyers not.	No convincing comparator; no disparate treatment or irrational enforcement shown.	Motion to dismiss denied; claim plausible.
Personal Involvement	Each defendant was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations.	Generalized allegations against "Marcy staff" insufficient for § 1983 liability.	Motion to dismiss denied; involvement plausible.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading requirement for plausibility in motions to dismiss)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (legal conclusions must be supported by factual allegations)
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (factual allegations must be taken as true at motion to dismiss)
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (First Amendment at the core of speech critical of government)
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (Equal Protection Clause: similarly situated must be treated alike)
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (facially neutral laws applied in a discriminatory manner can violate Equal Protection)
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (class-of-one equal protection theory)
LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1980) (selective enforcement under Equal Protection)
Dougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 282 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2002) (retaliatory intent can be inferred at pleading stage)
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2015) (plaintiff need only provide plausible support for minimal inference of discriminatory motivation)