AGAR Corporation, Inc. v. Electro Circuits International, LLC and Suresh Parikh
529 S.W.3d 559
| Tex. App. | 2017Background
- Agar Corporation sought en banc rehearing to overrule Mayes v. Stewart and change the statute-of-limitations rule for civil conspiracy.
- Agar argued civil conspiracy is a vicarious-liability theory and thus the limitations period governing the underlying tort should apply, not the two-year rule from section 16.003(a).
- The concurrence explains Texas law is unclear whether conspiracy is an independent tort, a vicarious-liability theory, or both, citing inconsistent Texas Supreme Court language and pattern-jury-charge guidance.
- Eleven Texas courts of appeals have followed Mayes, applying a two-year limitation to conspiracy claims; the First and Fourteenth Courts share a geographic jurisdiction, heightening the cost of intra-district conflict.
- The concurrence joined the denial of en banc rehearing to preserve uniformity within the shared First/Fourteenth jurisdiction and urged the Texas Supreme Court to resolve the legal uncertainty.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which statute of limitations applies to a civil-conspiracy claim? | Agar: apply the limitations period of the underlying tort (conspiracy is vicarious). | Appellees/precedent: two-year statute under Mayes applies to all conspiracy claims. | Court refused en banc rehearing; concurrence preserves Mayes two-year rule pending Texas Supreme Court clarification. |
| Is civil conspiracy an independent tort or a vicarious-liability theory? | Agar: conspiracy is vicarious — liability derives from underlying tort. | Opposing view: Texas cases are mixed; conspiracy has been treated as independent in some decisions and derivative in others. | Concurrence: Texas law is muddled; issue left to the Texas Supreme Court to clarify. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mayes v. Stewart, 11 S.W.3d 440 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000) (adopting two-year statute for conspiracy claims)
- Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1983) (sets out essential elements of civil conspiracy)
- Carroll v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 592 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1979) (discusses conspiracy as a means to impose joint and several liability)
- Chu v. Hong, 249 S.W.3d 441 (Tex. 2008) (addresses requirement of an underlying tort for conspiracy in some contexts)
- Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1996) (treats conspiracy as derivative in certain settings)
- Navarro v. Thornton, 316 S.W.3d 715 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010) (Fourteenth Court followed Mayes)
- Operation Rescue–Nat’l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston, 975 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1998) (supreme court language implying conspiracy can exist absent other tort liability)