AEA Federal Credit Union v. Yuma Funding, Inc.
237 Ariz. 105
| Ariz. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Yuma Funding obtained ~300 loans from AEA secured by vehicle titles and personal guaranties; AEA sued in Jan 2010 for breach and alleged risk of record destruction.
- The trial court entered an ex parte order (Jan 22, 2010) appointing a receiver for Yuma Funding; receiver took control, posted bond, and managed operations. Yuma Funding did not timely appear or object; default later entered.
- In July 2010 the court released the receiver, approved final compensation, ordered turnover of records, and set accounting deadlines; receiver filed reports through Sept. 2010.
- Yuma Funding first appeared substantively in Dec. 2012; in Jan. 2014 it moved to set aside the original appointment order and the July 2010 release order, asserting jurisdictional and due-process defects.
- The trial court denied Yuma Funding’s motion to set aside on Jan 30, 2014; Yuma Funding appealed. The Court of Appeals considered whether the denial orders were appealable.
Issues
| Issue | Yuma Funding's Argument | AEA's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an order denying a motion to set aside an order appointing a receiver is appealable under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(5)(b) | The statute’s punctuation change means “refusing to grant or dissolve” modifies “appointing a receiver,” so refusal-to-set-aside is appealable | The statute separately lists injunction-related orders and appointment of a receiver; an order refusing to set aside is not an appealable receivership appointment order | Not appealable; §12-2101(A)(5)(b) permits appeal from an order appointing a receiver, but not from a later denial of a motion to set aside that appointment |
| Whether an order denying a motion to set aside an order releasing/discharging a receiver is appealable | The motion to set aside the release is functionally equivalent to dissolving a receivership and thus appealable | §12-2101(A)(5)(b) covers appointment only; denials of motions to set aside releases are interlocutory and not independently appealable | Not appealable; no statute grants jurisdiction and the proper appellate vehicle is appeal from final judgment or final accounting |
| Whether the court should exercise special-action jurisdiction as an alternative | Timeliness and importance of jurisdiction/due-process issues justify special-action review | Adequate remedies by appeal exist; appeal window for appointment passed; extraordinary relief not warranted | Special-action jurisdiction declined; appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction |
Key Cases Cited
- Kemble v. Porter, 357 P.2d 155 (Ariz. 1960) (statutory definition of right to appeal)
- Ginn v. Superior Court, 404 P.2d 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965) (appeal is a privilege granted by constitution or statute)
- Musa v. Adrian, 636 P.2d 89 (Ariz. 1981) (no jurisdiction absent statutory authority)
- Jones v. Santa Cruz Cnty., 236 P.2d 361 (Ariz. 1951) (minor punctuation changes do not alter substance absent clear legislative intent)
- MCA Fin. Group v. Enter. Bank & Trust, 341 P.3d 1161 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (interpretation of §12-2101(A)(4) categories)
- Dowling v. Stapley, 211 P.3d 1235 (Ariz. 2009) (timely appeal required to preserve jurisdictional/due-process claims)
- Sato v. First Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 469 P.2d 829 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970) (failure to appeal appointment of receiver bars later appellate challenge)
- Ritter v. Ariz. Cattle Co., 271 P. 25 (Ariz. 1928) (interlocutory receivership orders reviewed on appeal from final account or judgment)