Advocates for Individuals With Disabilities LLC v. MidFirst Bank
279 F.Supp.3d 891
D. Ariz.2017Background
- AID (Advocates for Individuals With Disabilities LLC) and David Ritzenthaler sued MidFirst Bank in Arizona state court alleging ADA and AZDA violations based on purported parking-lot deficiencies; the complaint alleged only that Ritzenthaler "became aware" of the deficiencies and would avoid visiting—there was no allegation he ever visited or suffered a concrete injury.
- MidFirst removed to federal court; the complaint was a near-identical template used in hundreds/thousands of similar suits by attorneys Peter Strojnik and Fabian Zazueta seeking attorney fees (commonly a minimum $5,000) even when defendants promptly corrected minor defects.
- The district court ordered AID to show cause why the federal claims should not be dismissed for lack of standing; the court found AID lacked Article III standing and dismissed the federal ADA claims.
- AID moved to remand the remaining state-law AZDA claim to state court instead of dismissal; state court had consolidated and dismissed over 1,000 similar suits for lack of standing, leaving one anomalous case not dismissed due to an earlier judge’s ruling.
- Since filing, Arizona amended A.R.S. § 41-1492.08 to limit standing to an "aggrieved person" and to require pre-suit notice to private entities for alleged public-accommodation violations—changes that would bar AID’s template claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether federal court should remand state-law AZDA claim after dismissing ADA claims for lack of Article III standing | AID: Arizona has no Article III case-or-controversy requirement; AZDA’s then-text allowed "any person" to sue, so state court might accept the claim and remand is required | MidFirst: Remand would be futile because Arizona courts require standing and state law was amended to require an "aggrieved person" and pre-suit notice; superior court already dismissed 1,000+ similar suits for lack of standing | Denied remand; court dismissed case in full for lack of standing because remand would be futile |
| Whether AID has standing under federal law to pursue ADA claims | AID: Awareness of violation and intent to avoid constitutes injury | MidFirst: No concrete, particularized injury or actual denial of access; mere "tester" awareness insufficient | No Article III standing; federal claims dismissed |
| Whether Arizona courts would waive standing or otherwise permit AID’s suit | AID: Arizona judiciary may hear cases without federal Article III constraints; "any person" language allowed broad suits | MidFirst: Arizona courts have rigorous standing rules, rarely waive them, and have already rejected AID’s template suits; statutory amendment narrowed standing | Arizona would not allow this suit; waiver unlikely and statute now restricts standing to "aggrieved person" |
| Whether the futility exception (Bell) permits dismissal rather than remand | AID: Statute says remand; uncertainty about futility doctrine | MidFirst: Bell permits dismissal when remand would be certainly futile; here state law and practice make dismissal appropriate | Court applied futility doctrine and dismissed state claim rather than remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell v. City of Kellogg, 922 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1991) (recognizing futility exception to remand requirement and affirming dismissal where remand would be futile)
- Polo v. Innoventions Int’l, LLC, 833 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2016) (questioning but not overruling Bell’s futility doctrine)
- Powell-Cerkoney v. TCR-Montana Ranch Joint Venture, II, 176 Ariz. 275 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (discouraging "horizontal appeals" and revisiting prior judges’ rulings in superior court)
- Fernandez v. Takota Seat Belts, Inc., 210 Ariz. 138 (Ariz. 2005) (describing Arizona’s rigorous standing requirements)
- Bennett v. Napolitano, 206 Ariz. 520 (Ariz. 2003) (standing is a threshold requirement in Arizona courts)
- Sears v. Hull, 192 Ariz. 65 (Ariz. 1998) (Arizona generally follows federal standing principles and rarely waives standing)
- Matter of Swartz, 141 Ariz. 266 (Ariz. 1984) (ethical limit on unreasonable attorney fees)