288 So.3d 1070
Fla.2020Background
- Amendment 4 (approved Nov. 6, 2018) amended Fla. Const. art. VI, § 4 to restore voting rights "upon completion of all terms of sentence including parole or probation," except for murder and felony sexual offenses.
- Governor DeSantis requested an advisory opinion (Art. IV, § 1(c)) asking whether "all terms of sentence" includes legal financial obligations (LFOs: fines, restitution, costs, fees).
- The Florida Legislature enacted ch. 2019-162 (SB 7066) to implement Amendment 4, defining completion to include full payment of court-ordered LFOs; that statute was separately challenged in federal court.
- Sponsor statements and campaign materials (and amici) consistently represented that "all terms" encompassed obligations including fines, restitution, probation/parole conditions.
- The Florida Supreme Court accepted the advisory request, held it had jurisdiction to answer, and focused solely on whether "all terms of sentence" includes all LFOs.
- Holding: the Court concluded the phrase unambiguously covers obligations and therefore encompasses all LFOs imposed in conjunction with an adjudication of guilt.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Court jurisdiction to issue advisory opinion | Advisory opinion inappropriate re: statute; request is effectively about implementing/challenging ch. 2019-162 | Governor: question affects his executive duties to execute laws and direct Dept. of State | Court: has jurisdiction under Art. IV, §1(c); question within Governor's executive powers |
| Whether "all terms of sentence" means only durational terms (incarceration, parole, probation) | Non-State Parties: "terms" refers to time periods; listing of "parole or probation" implies durational focus | State Parties/Governor: plain text and context include obligations; "terms" read in context covers more than duration | Court: "all terms of sentence" naturally refers to obligations as well as durational components; not limited to time periods |
| Whether certain LFO categories (fines, restitution, fees/costs) are excluded | Some Non-State Parties: fees/costs (or non-punitive/technical LFOs) should be excluded; rule/form distinctions limit which LFOs qualify | State Parties/Governor: statutory, case, and ordinary usage show fines, restitution, fees/costs are sentencing terms | Court: rejects narrow/technical exclusions; holds "all terms of sentence" includes all LFOs imposed by the sentencing court |
Key Cases Cited
- Advisory Op. to Attorney Gen. re Voting Restoration Amend., 215 So. 3d 1202 (Fla. 2017) (determined Amendment 4 met ballot requirements; sponsor statements about scope)
- Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (Fourteenth Amendment permits felon disenfranchisement)
- Madison v. Washington, 163 P.3d 757 (Wash. 2007) (upheld re-enfranchisement conditioned on completion of sentence including LFOs)
- Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2010) (upheld scheme conditioning re-enfranchisement on payment of restitution)
- Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2010) (upheld requirement that fines/restitution be paid before restoration)
- Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2008) (construed "sentence" to include orders entered as part of sentencing process, such as costs and restitution)
- In re Advisory Opinion to Governor (Civil Rights), 306 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1975) (explains Court may issue advisory opinions affecting executive powers)