Adrienne Howell v. Father Maloney's Boys' Haven, 976 F.3d 750

Father Maloney’s Boys and Girls Haven is a private non-profit contracted by Kentucky to house, educate, and treat at-risk youth and is subject to state licensing and regulation.
Adrienne Howell was employed by the Haven as an equine specialist; in March 2017 a resident, Robert Brown Lester, attacked and sexually assaulted her, leaving her injured and unable to return to work.
Howell sued the Haven, Haven leadership, Lester, and state agency officials in state court asserting state-law claims and a §1983 claim for violation of her Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest.
Defendants removed to federal court; the district court dismissed the state agency and employees and dismissed Howell’s §1983 claim against the Haven as not a state actor, then remanded the state-law claims to state court.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding the Haven is not a state actor under §1983 and that contractual, regulatory, and licensing ties to the State do not make the Haven a public actor.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Public-function test: whether the Haven performs a function "traditionally and exclusively" governmental	Haven performs public functions (housing/treatment of state-placed children) and thus is a state actor	Care of children has long been performed by private entities; State did not exclusively perform this role	Haven is not a state actor under the public-function test; function not traditionally/exclusively governmental
Joint action / symbiotic relationship: whether the State and Haven acted jointly or the State compelled the conduct	State contracted with and placed children at the Haven, creating a close nexus and joint participation	Contracting, placement, and ordinary supervision do not create interdependence or joint state action	No joint action or symbiotic relationship; contract and placement alone insufficient to make Haven a state actor
Regulatory/licensing effect: whether compliance with regulations or licensing transforms the Haven into a state actor	State regulation and licensing, plus standards of care, make the Haven effectively a state actor	Extensive regulation does not convert private actors into state actors; otherwise nearly all regulated entities would be public	Regulatory compliance and licensure do not convert the Haven into a state actor

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (establishes §1983 requires action ‘‘under color of state law’')
Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377 (tests when private actors may be treated as state actors)
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (private school providing public services not necessarily a state actor)
Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921 (function must be traditionally and exclusively governmental to yield state action)
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (private utility’s public function did not make it a state actor)
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (private contractor in a state-managed, correctional setting treated as state actor)
Brent v. Wayne County Dep’t of Human Servs., 901 F.3d 656 (6th Cir.—fact-specific allegations of close state–private collaboration can support state-action inference)
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (joint participation doctrine requires substantial interdependence)
S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (extensive regulation alone does not transform private actors into state actors)
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (joint action / conspiracy doctrine for state involvement)