15 F.4th 1219
9th Cir.2021Background
- On July 6, 2017, Adrian Miranda, after heavy drinking, refused on three separate prompts to consent to chemical testing under Arizona’s implied-consent form; officers later obtained a telephonic warrant and drew his blood.
- Station-house video later showed Miranda telling an officer he would "do the bloodwork," a fact not credited at the first administrative hearing.
- At the first Arizona DOT administrative hearing, Officer Rush testified Miranda never recanted; the ALJ credited Rush and suspended Miranda’s license for 12 months.
- After CBP obtained the station videos, Miranda got a second administrative hearing where a different ALJ found Miranda voluntarily submitted and voided the suspension.
- Miranda sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Rush lied at the first administrative hearing and deprived him of procedural due process; the district court granted summary judgment for defendants and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an officer’s alleged false testimony at an administrative license-suspension hearing can support a § 1983 procedural due process claim | Rush lied under oath causing a wrongful, temporary deprivation of Miranda’s property (driver’s license) | Arizona provided adequate process (warrant, administrative hearings, post-deprivation review); any false testimony was unauthorized and remediable by state procedures | No – procedural due process claim fails because adequate post-deprivation remedies were available and used |
| Whether Devereaux/Costanich control the result and create a federal due-process violation for fabricated evidence | Devereaux/Costanich establish that deliberately fabricated evidence can violate due process | Those cases address substantive due process in different contexts (criminal/child/foster proceedings) and are distinguishable | Distinguished – those precedents do not mandate relief here because Miranda’s claim sounds in procedural, not substantive, due process |
| Whether the officer’s conduct was “authorized,” requiring different pre-deprivation protections | Miranda contends Rush abused authority and acted deliberately to cause deprivation | Court treats alleged lying as unauthorized; unauthorized acts are typically remedied by adequate post-deprivation procedures under Parratt/Hudson | Court held Rush’s alleged misconduct was unauthorized and post-deprivation process (including a second hearing that reinstated the license) was sufficient |
Key Cases Cited
- Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (post-deprivation remedies can satisfy due process for random or unauthorized acts by state employees)
- Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (extends Parratt to intentional misconduct; adequate state post-deprivation remedies suffice)
- Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (due process flexible for license suspensions; post-deprivation process can be sufficient)
- Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (limits Parratt reasoning; cautions about converting Fourteenth Amendment into general tort remedy)
- Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (driver’s license deprivation implicates due process)
- Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (pre-deprivation process required when deprivation is foreseeable/authorized)
- Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. en banc) (fabrication of evidence can implicate due process in certain criminal/liberty contexts)
- Costanich v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 627 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir.) (fabricating evidence in child/foster proceedings implicated substantive due process; procedural claim rejected when multiple post-deprivation reviews existed)
- Franceschi v. Yee, 887 F.3d 927 (9th Cir.) (driver’s license is not a fundamental right; due process analysis contextual)