Adkins v. State
301 Ga. 153
| Ga. | 2017Background
- On May 16, 2013 a drive-by shooting killed Frederick Early and wounded Briona Moore and Pamphylia (Pammy) Baynes; Adkins was tried by jury and convicted of malice murder, multiple counts of felony murder, firearm offenses, and four aggravated assaults.
- At trial Baynes and Moore both identified Adkins (street names “Fly” / “Fly Monkey”) as the shooter; Baynes testified she heard Early say “Fly, Fly, Fly” after being shot.
- The prosecutor referenced Baynes’s expected testimony about Early’s utterance in opening; defense objected but the court overruled. The State did not elicit the dying-statement on direct; defense counsel later elicited Baynes’s account on cross-examination.
- Two law-enforcement witnesses (Sergeant Manuel and Detective Sammons) gave testimony the defense later challenged as improper opinion/bolstering regarding witness statements and the officer’s “instinct.”
- Adkins moved that two aggravated-assault convictions based on the same shooting of Baynes (Counts 8 and 9) should merge; the trial court had merged a different pair of assaults but not these. The Court of Appeals (state supreme court) reviews and rules.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Early’s alleged dying declaration (Baynes’s report of “Fly, Fly, Fly”) | State: admissible as dying declaration; prosecutor relied on Baynes’s testimony | Adkins: admission violated hearsay/Confrontation; trial court erred in permitting it | Not reversible — Adkins’s counsel elicited the testimony on cross; invited/error waiver prevents reversal |
| Admission of Sergeant Manuel’s opinion that Moore’s initial mask statement was dishonest | State: testimony was permissible impression/explanation of interviews | Adkins: testimony improperly bolstered witness credibility | Any error harmless — testimony was limited, potentially undermined Moore’s consistency, and other strong identification evidence existed |
| Admission of Detective Sammons’s testimony that his “instinct” told him Baynes knew the shooter | State: permissible explanation for investigative choices | Adkins: improper opinion about witness credibility | Not an abuse of discretion — testimony explained investigative conduct and did not vouch for credibility |
| Merger of Counts 8 and 9 (two aggravated assaults on Baynes for same shooting) | Adkins: convictions duplicate same conduct and must merge | State: counts charged different statutory theories (deadly weapon vs. discharging from moving vehicle) | Conviction/sentence for Count 8 vacated — Count 9 (discharging from moving vehicle) subsumes the deadly-weapon assault; remand for resentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (establishes sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard)
- Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753 (invited error / defendant generally cannot complain about evidence he introduced)
- Givens v. State, 273 Ga. 818 (state-court authority on complaining about evidence a defendant introduced)
- Manzano v. State, 282 Ga. 557 (witness may not vouch for another witness’s credibility)
- Marshall v. State, 276 Ga. 854 (context matters when evaluating alleged improper opinion testimony)
- Lindsey v. State, 282 Ga. 447 (harmless-error standard for nonconstitutional errors)
- Rushin v. State, 180 Ga. App. 276 (shooting is use of a deadly weapon)