Adib Makdessi v. Lt. Fields, 789 F.3d 126

Background

Plaintiff Adib Makdessi, a small, physically and mentally vulnerable inmate, testified he repeatedly complained about being attacked and sexually assaulted in Virginia prisons.
In August 2010 Makdessi was celled with Michael Smith, an aggressive gang member; Makdessi alleged multiple assaults culminating in a violent sexual assault on December 21, 2010.
Makdessi filed numerous written grievances and letters prior to December 21; he says staff (including Defs. Fields, King, Gallihar) were notified or should have known of the risk but took no protective action.
At bench trial the magistrate judge found Makdessi suffered serious injuries and had filed many grievances but recommended judgment for defendants because he concluded the defendants lacked actual subjective knowledge of the risk. The district court adopted that recommendation.
On appeal the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the dismissal as to Fields, King, and Gallihar, holding the lower courts failed to apply Farmer's principle that subjective knowledge can be proven circumstantially when a risk is so obvious that officials must have known it.
The panel affirmed waiver of challenges to three other defendants (Bellamy, Boyd, Hall) for lack of specific objections below; remand requires reconsideration under the proper legal framework, though defendants can still rebut liability.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether prison officials were deliberately indifferent under the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect Makdessi from inmate-on-inmate sexual/physical assault	Makdessi: his vulnerability plus numerous written grievances and the obvious mismatch with a gang-affiliated cellmate made the risk obvious; actual knowledge may be proven circumstantially	Defendants: they lacked actual knowledge of the substantial risk; some had no role in cell assignments and denied receiving or seeing grievances	Vacated and remanded as to Fields, King, Gallihar because the lower courts failed to apply Farmer's rule that actual knowledge can be inferred from obviously evident risks; defendants may still rebut on remand
Whether failure to expressly tell specific supervisors that he feared for his life defeats an obvious-risk inference	Makdessi: explicit notice not required when risk is obvious or when prior grievances/warnings were made	Defendants: lack of direct notice to them means no actual knowledge	Court: direct notice is not dispositive; Farmer rejects requiring prior protest as a prerequisite
Whether evidence of prior grievances and prison policy violations suffices to show officials "must have known" of risk	Makdessi: longstanding, well-documented complaints and failure to follow protective protocols support an inference of knowledge	Defendants: grievances might have been routed elsewhere or were general and not seen by these officials	Court: such circumstantial evidence can satisfy the subjective knowledge element and must be considered on remand; lower court did not adequately assess it
Preservation of claims on appeal for certain defendants	N/A	Defendants: Makdessi failed to specifically object to magistrate's dismissal of Bellamy, Boyd, Hall	Held: Makdessi waived appellate review of claims against Bellamy, Boyd, Hall for lack of specific objections

Key Cases Cited

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (subjective actual-knowledge standard can be proved via circumstantial evidence; risk so obvious the official must have known)
Brice v. Virginia Beach Corr. Ctr., 58 F.3d 101 (4th Cir. 1995) (even subjective standard can be shown by inference from obvious risk; refusing to ‘‘bury head in sand’’)
Helton v. AT & T, Inc., 709 F.3d 343 (4th Cir. 2013) (standard of review for bench-trial judgments: factual findings for clear error, legal conclusions de novo)
Danser v. Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2014) (prisoner may not rely on unsupported speculation; knowledge inference requires exposure to information concerning risk)
Brown v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 612 F.3d 720 (4th Cir. 2010) (deliberate indifference requires actual knowledge and disregard of excessive risk)