347 Conn. 416
Conn.2023Background:
- On Aug. 10, 2017 Officer Jonathan Sykes, with lights and siren activated, attempted to pass several cars and, while traveling ~71.8 mph, entered the opposite lane and collided with Marline Adesokan’s vehicle as she made a left turn; Adesokan and her two children were injured.
- Adesokan sued the Town of Bloomfield, its police department, and Sykes for negligence, negligent supervision, and respondeat superior.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment asserting discretionary act (governmental) immunity under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n(a)(2)(B); the trial court granted the motion relying on this court’s Borelli decision about pursuits.
- On appeal the question was whether discretionary act immunity bars negligence claims arising from how an emergency vehicle is operated under the privileges of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-283 (including the § 14-283(d) duty to "drive with due regard").
- The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding that § 52-557n(a)(2)(B)’s savings clause (“except as otherwise provided by law”) preserves the codified duty in § 14-283(d) and therefore discretionary act immunity does not apply, so the summary judgment was improper; the court did not decide whether the duty is ministerial or discretionary.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 52-557n(a)(2)(B) bars negligence claims for the manner of operating an emergency vehicle under § 14-283 | Adesokan: § 14-283(d)’s "due regard" duty precludes immunity; negligence claims allowed | Town/Sykes: § 14-283 privileges vest discretion in operators; discretionary immunity applies | Held: Immunity does not apply as a matter of law because § 14-283(d) is an "except as otherwise provided by law" exception to § 52-557n(a)(2)(B) |
| Whether § 14-283(d)’s "drive with due regard" duty is ministerial or discretionary | Adesokan: duty is ministerial (no judgment/discretion) | Town/Sykes: duty requires judgment and is discretionary (immunity) | Court declined to decide; unnecessary once § 14-283(d) qualifies as a savings-clause exception |
| Whether historical statutory context and precedent (e.g., Tetro, indemnification statutes) show legislature did not intend to shield vehicular negligence by immunity | Adesokan: legislative history, prior cases, and indemnification statutes show municipalities were liable for vehicular negligence and § 52-557n shouldn’t displace that | Town/Sykes: § 52-557n generally grants immunity for discretionary acts, including driving choices when privileges apply | Held: Historical materials, prior case law (Tetro) and indemnification statutes support that § 14-283(d) preserves negligence liability and that § 52-557n was not meant to immunize emergency vehicle operation |
Key Cases Cited
- Borelli v. Renaldi, 336 Conn. 1 (Conn. 2020) (held § 14-283(d) required judgment re: initiating/continuing pursuits and applied discretionary-act immunity to that decision)
- Daley v. Kashmanian, 344 Conn. 464 (Conn. 2022) (analyzed § 52-557n legislative history and motor-vehicle statutory scheme; held non-emergency soft-car operation not immune)
- Tetro v. Stratford, 189 Conn. 601 (Conn. 1983) (municipality vicariously liable for negligent high-speed police pursuit; emergency-vehicle operator remained subject to duty of due care)
- Grady v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324 (Conn. 2009) (interpreted "except as otherwise provided by law" in § 52-557n to incorporate common-law exceptions to discretionary-act immunity)
- Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, 219 Conn. 179 (Conn. 1991) (discussed scope of § 52-557n and the statute's relationship to preexisting common law)
- Tefft v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 116 Conn. 127 (Conn. 1933) (early articulation of the due-care standard applicable to emergency vehicle operators)