845 N.W.2d 88
Mich.2014Background
- Addison Township cited Barnhart for operating a shooting range without a zoning permit; trial court granted a directed verdict protecting the range under MCL 691.1542a(2).
- The circuit court affirmed; the Court of Appeals reversed in Barnhart I and remanded to assess the range under the SSRA and generally accepted operation practices.
- On remand, the district court (and then the circuit court) ruled for Barnhart; the Court of Appeals again reversed, holding the activities were not protected under MCL 691.1542a.
- The Michigan Supreme Court granted review to resolve whether the scope and protection of the SSRA immunities apply based on the range’s design/operation and pre-1994 existence.
- The parties stipulated that the range existed before 1994 and was used for recreational and business shooting; evidence showed ongoing sport shooting classes and use by family, friends, and some public participants.
- The Court held that a range must be a sport shooting range as defined by the SSRA, existed as such as of July 5, 1994, and operate in generally accepted operation practices to qualify for protection under MCL 691.1542a(2).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What defines a sport shooting range for SSRA eligibility? | Barnhart I incorrectly equated sport shooting range with commercial purpose. | Design and operation determine range status; commercial aim is irrelevant. | Sport shooting range defined by design/operation; commercial purpose irrelevant. |
| Does MCL 691.1542a(2) protect ranges if they existed before July 5, 1994 and operate with generally accepted practices? | Protection should apply if range existed pre-1994 and adheres to practices | Protection depends on contemporaneous compliance with local ordinances as well | Protection applies only if range existed as of 7/5/1994, is a sport shooting range, and operates in generally accepted practices. |
| Is the range here a sport shooting range under MCL 691.1541(d)? | Range falls within the statute’s scope by being designed/operated for sport shooting | Court of Appeals erred by focusing on pre-SSRA commercial use rather than design/operation | Yes; it is a sport shooting range under the statutory definition. |
| Did the range comply with generally accepted operation practices? | Evidence shows compliance despite some NRCS Manual deviations | Deviation from the Manual undermines compliance | Range complied with generally accepted operation practices; the Manual is advisory. |
| What is the effect of a range’s commercial use on SSRA protections? | Commercial use does not disqualify SSRA protections if range is designed/operated for sport shooting | Commercial use could undermine eligibility | Commercial purpose is not dispositive; focus remains on design/operation and pre-1994 existence. |
Key Cases Cited
- Tryc v. Michigan Veterans' Facility, 451 Mich 129 (1996) (statutory interpretation controls when term defined; legislative intent)
- Dana Corp. v. Employment Security Comm., 371 Mich 107 (1963) (stipulations binding on fact, not law)
- Ray Twp v. B & BS Gun Club, 226 Mich App 724 (1997) (SSRA context and range protections)
- People v. Metamora Water Serv, Inc., 276 Mich App 376 (2007) (use of stipulations in appellate review)
