Adan Tomas-Ramos v. Merrick Garland, 24 F.4th 973

Background

Tomas-Ramos, a Guatemalan national, reentered the U.S. in 2018 after a prior removal; DHS reinstated his prior removal order but he expressed fear of return based on gang threats tied to his refusal to let his son join a gang.
He underwent an asylum officer reasonable-fear screening; the officer found him credible but concluded he failed to show a reasonable possibility of persecution or torture (family did not constitute a cognizable particular social group; no evidence of government acquiescence to torture).
On IJ review, Tomas-Ramos was represented; the IJ reviewed materials, questioned him, denied counsel’s request to make a closing statement, and issued a brief order concurring with the asylum officer, citing: no nexus to a protected ground, respondent can relocate, and difficulty articulating fear.
Tomas-Ramos petitioned for judicial review in the Fourth Circuit. The government argued for a highly deferential Mandel standard; Tomas-Ramos argued the IJ misapplied nexus and other legal standards and that counsel was denied participation.
The Fourth Circuit held the agency erred on nexus: family membership (parent of son) qualifies as a particular social group and the record compels that the gang targeted him at least in part because of that relationship; because the IJ never applied the presumption/rebuttal framework for relocation after past persecution, the relocation finding cannot stand.
Court vacated and remanded the reasonable-fear denial (including the torture claim) for the agency to reassess under the correct legal standards; declined to decide the broader right-to-counsel question as premature.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether IJ erred in finding no nexus between harm and a protected ground	Tomas-Ramos: gang threats were because he refused to let his son join; family membership is a protected ground and was a central reason for persecution	Government: threats were motivated by gang recruitment, not by a protected ground; family here lacks the necessary social distinction	Court: Error — family ties are a prototypical particular social group; record compels finding that family relationship was at least one central reason for persecution (vacated and remanded)
Proper standard of judicial review for reasonable-fear IJ decisions	Tomas-Ramos: review under ordinary substantial-evidence standard	Government: apply more deferential Mandel “facially legitimate and bona fide” standard	Court: Mandel inapplicable; apply substantial-evidence review
Whether the IJ properly found respondent could avoid harm by relocating	Tomas-Ramos: relocation inquiry must account for presumption of future persecution after past persecution; IJ never applied rebuttable-presumption framework	Government: IJ’s relocation finding independently supports denial	Court: Remand required — because past persecution is established, the agency must consider relocation under the presumption/rebuttal (preponderance) framework; current relocation finding cannot stand
Whether counsel was denied required participation (closing statement/right to counsel at IJ review)	Tomas-Ramos: statutory right to counsel under 8 U.S.C. §1362 includes participation before IJ; counsel was denied closing statement, violating rights	Government: regulations grant closing-argument right only at asylum-officer interview; IJ discretion at review hearings	Court: Declined to decide as premature; remand will allow IJ to permit counsel participation or firm up record on the claim

Key Cases Cited

Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (establishes narrow "facially legitimate and bona fide" review principle in visa-denial context)
Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944 (4th Cir. 2015) (threats for refusing to let son join gang satisfy nexus via family membership)
Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117 (4th Cir. 2011) (death threats qualify as persecution; family as particular social group)
Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2018) (withholding-of-removal standards and mandatory relief discussion)
Romero v. Attorney General, 972 F.3d 334 (3d Cir. 2020) (rejecting Mandel standard outside visa context)
Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2016) (applying substantial-evidence review to reasonable-fear determinations)
Perez Vasquez v. Garland, 4 F.4th 213 (4th Cir. 2021) (explaining "one central reason" nexus standard and substantial-evidence review)