359 P.3d 990
Alaska Ct. App.2015Background
- On July 1, 2011 troopers stopped Nathan L. Adams after multiple 911 callers and a trooper observed erratic, dangerous driving and his vehicle had left the roadway and struck a culvert. Adams was sluggish, slurred his speech, staggered, and performed poorly on field sobriety tests.
- Breath test showed no alcohol; troopers found empty clonazepam bottles, a marijuana pipe, and ~5.82 grams of marijuana in Adams’s car. Adams said he had slept only six hours.
- A blood sample drawn about seven hours after arrest initially tested negative; a later test (disclosed ~a week before trial) showed 0.03 mg clonazepam per liter. The State’s expert testified that this level can impair balance, cognition, and reaction time and that levels likely were higher while driving.
- Adams, a repeat DUI offender, was charged with felony DUI (AS 28.35.030) for driving under the influence of clonazepam and with sixth-degree misconduct for the marijuana; he asserted exhaustion, not clonazepam, caused his impairment.
- The State disclosed its blood-analysis expert less than the 45 days required by Crim. R. 16(b)(1)(B). The court offered a short continuance within the existing Rule 45 speedy-trial timeline or a full 45-day continuance if Adams waived his speedy-trial calculation; Adams rejected both and proceeded to trial.
- A jury convicted Adams. On appeal he challenged (1) the jury instruction on causation (whether exhaustion could be considered), (2) admission of the State’s late-noticed expert, and (3) sufficiency of the evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Adams) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jury instruction on causation: whether the jury could convict if exhaustion contributed to impairment | The jury instruction allowed conviction even if impairment was caused by exhaustion rather than clonazepam; the jury should have been told exhaustion cannot be incorporated | The statute requires the State prove the controlled substance was a direct/proximate cause; it need not be the sole cause — exhaustion can be a contributing factor | Court affirmed: instruction adequate — State must prove clonazepam was a direct/proximate cause (but not sole cause); jury was told "singly or in combination" did not include exhaustion and that clonazepam must be a direct cause |
| Admission of State expert after late disclosure under Crim. R. 16 | Late notice prejudiced incarcerated defendant; remedy should have been exclusion of expert (or dismissal) | Trial court offered continuance(s); late disclosure was inadvertent, not bad faith; continuance is normal remedy and was refused by Adams | Court affirmed: no abuse of discretion. Continuance is usual remedy; Adams rejected offered relief and did not show offered continuance inadequate |
| Sufficiency of evidence for DUI (clonazepam cause) | Evidence was insufficient to prove impairment was proximately caused by clonazepam given possible role of exhaustion | Trooper observations, poor field tests, presence of clonazepam, and expert testimony that 0.03 mg/L can impair support conviction | Court affirmed: viewing evidence in the light most favorable to verdict, a rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt |
Key Cases Cited
- Winschel v. Brown, 171 P.3d 142 (Alaska 2007) (discussing proximate-cause/substantial-factor test in criminal cases)
- Molina v. State, 186 P.3d 28 (Alaska App. 2008) (defining "under the influence" standard for DUI causation)
- Bostic v. State, 805 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1991) (continuance is typical remedy for discovery violation; court may impose other sanctions if continuance inadequate)
- Moore v. State, 262 P.3d 217 (Alaska App. 2011) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence on appeal)
- Hinson v. State, 199 P.3d 1166 (Alaska App. 2008) (application of reasonable-juror standard for sufficiency review)
- Gunderson v. Anchorage, 762 P.2d 104 (Alaska App. 1988) (cited for DUI instruction language authority)